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My two principal aims in this essay are interconnected. One aim is to provide a new interpretation 
of the ‘infinite modes’ in Spinoza’s Ethics. I argue that for Spinoza, God, conceived as the one 
infinite and eternal substance, is not to be understood as causing two kinds of modes, some infi-
nite and eternal and the rest finite and non-eternal. That there cannot be such a bifurcation of 
divine effects is what I take the ‘infinite mode’ propositions, E1p21–23, to establish; E1p21–23 
show that each and every one of the immanent effects of an infinite and eternal God is an infi-
nite and eternal mode. The other aim is to show that these propositions can be understood as 
part of an extended critical response to Descartes’s infamous doctrine that God creates eternal 
truths and true and immutable natures. If we have the correct (Spinozan) conceptions of what 
God is and how God works, we see that an eternal and infinite God can only be understood to 
cause ‘eternal truths,’ and that these eternal truths are infinite and eternal modes of God.
Keywords: infinite modes; eternal truths; true and immutable natures; Spinoza’s response to 
Descartes; divine causation
I
Some elements of Spinoza’s system are recognized to be integral to it, even if it is unclear what, precisely, 
those elements are. The modes ‘which exist necessarily and are infinite’ (E1p23), or the ‘things which are 
infinite by virtue of their cause’ (Ep. 12, G IV.53),1 are among these elements. Passages explicitly mentioning 
what have come to be called the ‘infinite modes’ are few, the demonstrations in the Ethics concerning them 
are some of the most abstruse in a book full of hard-to-follow arguments, and the clarifications Spinoza 
provides in his correspondence are obscure and exasperatingly brief.2 
Nevertheless, there is consensus that there are two basic kinds of modes, infinite modes and finite modes, 
and that the former supply a causal link between the one infinite, eternal, necessarily existing substance 
and the more familiar world of finite modes. Without the link, it looks like Spinoza’s system is inconsist-
ent. Spinoza says that finite things come to be from other finite things (E1p28), but he also says that the 
one infinite, eternal, necessarily existing substance causes modes that are infinite, eternal, and necessary 
(E1p21–23). The one substance, God, is the cause of all things (E1p18). How can that be the case if God 
causes what is infinite, but what is finite is caused by what is finite?3 
Scholars have answered this question in a variety of ways. Some propose that infinite modes are features 
of reality described by laws of nature. Finite things and these infinite modes are each necessary, but only 
jointly sufficient, for the coming to be of finite things; God is the cause of finite things because God causes 
 1 Where G = Spinoza (1972). Other abbreviations: E = Ethics (references by PartTypeNumber, so E1p15 is Ethics, Part 1, Proposi-
tion 15), Ep = Letters, KV = Short Treatise, CM = Cogitata Metaphysica, PPC = Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, TIE = Treatise on 
the Emendation of the Intellect. AT = Descartes (1964–74). I have used Curley’s translations of Spinoza’s texts and Cottingham, 
Stoothoff, and Murdoch’s translations of Descartes’s texts, sometimes with modifications. 
 2 Spinoza does not use the term ‘modus infinitus.’ For discussion, see Gabbey 2008. Texts taken to concern the infinite modes are 
E1p21–23, KV I. xiii–ix, Ep. 64, and TIE 101. 
 3 This is an old question. For an early articulation, see Leibniz’s (1999: 70) comments on Wachter. For a recent overview of responses 
to the question, see Newlands (2018b).
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these infinite modes.4 Others argue that while some infinite modes are pervasive, general features of real-
ity5 (and perhaps other infinite modes are the ‘formal essences’ of finite things),6 a different infinite mode 
supplies the needed causal link between God and things: finite things are caused by God in virtue of being 
parts (or perhaps modes) of the infinite mode that is the entire series of finite things taken together.7 Some 
hold that the infinite modes are to be found in a hierarchy of being that goes from the infinite cause, God, 
through infinite modes, to finite effects.8 
Besides the view that infinite modes causally link God and finite things, another prevalent assumption 
about infinite modes is that whatever they are, Spinoza invented them. Yitzhak Melamed, for example, 
writes that the notion of an infinite mode ‘is probably the only Spinozist concept that has no equivalent 
among his predecessors or contemporaries’ (2013: 113. Cf. Martin 2008: 500). While Spinoza’s concepts 
attribute, substance, and mode are new models of old concepts, the concept infinite mode is often thought 
to lack a precursor.9
It is undeniable that there is a sense in which these entities are original to Spinoza. That God should 
have any modes at all is a new claim, since many of Spinoza’s predecessors and contemporaries would not 
have accepted that God has modes, let alone eternal, necessary modes. Modes were often thought to be 
impermanent.10 
Yet in another sense, the infinite modes do have a precursor: namely, Descartes’s concept of an eternal 
truth freely created by God. Others have pointed out that for Spinoza, essences—at least ‘formal essences’—
are eternal, even ‘eternal truths.’11 Since essences are caused by God (E1p25), scholars who think that those 
formal essences, or eternal truths, are infinite modes12 might be amenable to the suggestion that the ‘infi-
nite modes’ are descendants of the Cartesian eternal truths. What has not been investigated, however, is how 
the ‘infinite mode’ propositions E1p21–23 might figure in a critical response to Descartes’s doctrine that 
God creates eternal, necessary truths (henceforth the Creation Doctrine). I take up that task here and attempt 
to show that more of the arguments between E1p15 and E1p25 involve criticisms of, as well as corrections 
to, the Creation Doctrine than has been appreciated. E1p21–23 are central to this response.13 
 4 See Curley (1969: 58–62, 1988: 47–48, 1990: 122–126), and Curley and Walski (1999). Curley also argues that the ‘common 
notions’ central to cognition of the second kind, reason (E2p40s2), are ideas of the infinite modes, or laws of physics (see also Yovel 
1989: 161; Bennett 1984: 107; and Miller 2003).
 5 According to Nadler, some infinite modes of extension are laws of Euclidean geometry (2012).
 6 ‘Formal essences’ is a term Spinoza uses in E2p8 (and also in his description of the best kind of cognition, scientia intuitiva, in 
E2p40s2). What Spinoza means by ‘formal’ is a point of debate, but it is often thought that a thing’s ‘formal’ essence is an eternal 
essence. This essence is to be contrasted with a thing’s ‘actual’ essence, its conatus, its striving to persevere in its being [in suo esse] 
(E3p7). For the view that formal essences are, along with general and specific laws of nature, infinite modes, see Garrett (2009; cf. 
Martin 2008; Martin 2018; Ward 2011). Scribano holds that the entire series of formal essences is a ‘mediate’ infinite mode that 
enjoys eternal reality (2008: 55). For the purposes of this paper, I follow many other scholars in assuming that for Spinoza, the 
statement ‘something exists’ is underspecified: does the thing exist as something concrete and enduring over time, or as something 
that is not properly thought of in time at all? Supposing that there are different formal realities comes with its own questions and 
difficulties, and elsewhere I explore what, if we assume there are these different realities, the structure of Spinoza’s monist system 
might have to be (see Primus 2019, unpublished manuscript). I will not address their arguments here, but Klein (2014) and Laerke 
(2017) hold that Spinoza did not think there are different kinds of reality at work in Spinoza’s system (cf. Deleuze 1968: 44–58). 
According to Laerke, grasping the ‘formal essence’ of a thing never involves grasping anything ‘beyond the [actual] thing itself’: 
grasping the formal essence is ‘grasping the form of the thing itself, its specific structure [i.e., its specific relative configuration of 
parts], insofar as this thing is contained in the attributes either qua existent, through the causes that makes it exist, or qua non-
existent, through the causes that exclude it from existence.’ The form is ‘objectively conceived by the intellect as an eternal truth 
and the form itself eternally contained in the attribute.’ (2017: 32–33).
 7 This is a popular view. See Garrett (1991: 198) for an early statement, and Curley and Walski (1999) for criticism. For a recent 
position that largely follows Garrett, see Lord (2010: 40–41). Melamed also follows Garrett but adds that Spinoza introduced 
infinite modes because he needed a divisible, yet infinite, intermediary between the indivisible and infinite cause and finite things 
(2013: 132).
 8 See Gueroult (1968: I.309) and Miller (2009: 109–110). Melamed’s view, according to which the infinite series of infinite modes 
is a series of modes decreasing in perfection, has a tinge of neo-Platonism to it (2013: 120–121). An example Spinoza offers in Ep. 
64 of an infinite mode, ‘the face of the universe,’ also suggests emanation; Spinoza appears to be appropriating the Kabbalistic 
term ‘faces’ (partzufim), which refers to the mediate emanations from the Infinite (Ein Sof) through the Sefirot (ten attributes). Cf. 
Wolfson (1934: I.244–245).
 9 Curley, however, sees a precursor of the infinite modes in Plotinus (1993: 127–128).
 10 See Descartes’s Principles I.56 (AT VIIIA.26) and Comments on a Certain Broadsheet (AT VIIIB.348).
 11 E.g., Bréhier (1968), Viljanen (2011), and Ward (2011). See Ep. 10: ‘things [res] or the affections of things [rerum affectiones] are 
eternal truths [aeternae veritates].’ Cf. KV I.1. 
 12 E.g., Garrett (2009), Martin (2008, 2018).
 13 It is likely Spinoza had access to the correspondence in which Descartes discusses the Creation Doctrine. Although it was not 
listed in the 1677 inventory of Spinoza’s books, in his exposition of Descartes’s Principles, Spinoza does refer to Letter 118 in the 
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Before I say more about my aims for this essay, it will be helpful to have the Creation Doctrine in view. 
According to Descartes, God does not just freely create contingent, durational existents, but also necessary, 
eternal truths, including ‘true and immutable natures.’14 In Descartes’s own words,
You … ask what necessitated God to create these truths; and I reply that he was free to make it not 
true at all that the radii of the circle are equal—just as free as he was not to create the world. (Letter 
to Mersenne, 27 May 1630, AT I.152)
I turn to the difficulty of conceiving how God would have been acting freely and indifferently if he 
had made it false that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, or in general that 
contradictories could not be true together. It is easy to dispel this difficulty by considering that the 
power of God cannot have any limits. (Letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644, AT IV.118)15 
I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about by God. For 
since every basis of truth and goodness depends on his omnipotence, I would not dare to say that 
God cannot make a mountain without a valley, or bring it about that 1 and 2 are not 3. (Letter to 
Arnauld, 29 July 1648, AT V.224)
That God’s will was free does not prevent these truths from being necessary truths. God did not just will that 
it be true that triangles have three sides; he also willed—efficaciously—that this truth be necessary.16 
Most scholarly literature on Descartes’s doctrine focuses on modal metaphysics. Some commentators have 
concluded that the necessity of the eternal truths is mere conceptual or epistemic necessity, not meta-
physical necessity.17 However, a view according to which there is no metaphysical necessity—but instead a 
‘universal possibilism’18—looks to be in tension with some central Cartesian claims,19 so other scholars have 
sought alternatives. Curley, for example, suggests the eternal truths are necessary, albeit not necessarily 
necessary.20 God’s will is free because it was not necessitated to create the eternal truths. Nevertheless, the 
truths God wills to be necessary are necessary, although their necessity requires the assumption of God’s free 
creation of them as necessary. They are thus not absolutely necessary.21 
What scholarly literature there is on Spinoza’s response to the Creation Doctrine centers on his rejection 
of Descartes’s views of divine freedom, the divine will, and necessity.22 That is, for Spinoza, all things neces-
sarily follow from God’s necessarily existing nature (E1p11, E1p16); all things ‘have necessarily flowed … by 
the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows … that its three angles 
Clerselier edition of Descartes’s correspondence (See G I.195). Letter 118 appears in the first (1657) edition of the correspondence, 
as do most of the letters to Mersenne and Mesland concerning the creation of the eternal truths. Descartes’s 15 April 1630 letter 
to Mersenne does not appear until the second (1659) edition. 
 14 Descartes identifies essences and eternal truths in the 27 May 1630 letter to Mersenne (AT I.152).
 15 Descartes’s Aristotelian predecessors thought that God needed to act in conformity with logical laws, but this was not seen as a 
limitation of God’s power. See Alanen (1985).
 16 See AT VII.432, AT VII.380, and AT IV.118. 
 17 See, e.g., Plantinga (1980), Marion (1980), and Bouveresse (1983). For discussion, see Bennett (1994: 63–655), Ishiguro (1986: 
461–463), and Alanen (2008: 360–363).
 18 The basic thought behind the ‘universal possibilism,’ a view often attributed to Frankfurt (1977), is this: because God could have 
freely made the contradictories of the eternal truths true (see AT V.224), it cannot be the case that the eternal truths are neces-
sary. In order for God to freely create an eternal truth P, it must be the case that God could have willed that not-P is true. It seems, 
however, that God could have only willed that not-P is true if not-P is possible. But if it is the case that for any eternal truth P, it is 
possible that not-P, then P is not a necessary truth. For a summary of problems with this view, see Kaufman (2002: 27–30). Alanen 
(1985, 1988) argues that we ought not to seek a modal theory that will apply both to God’s act of creation and to the eternal truths 
created; we should take Descartes at his word when he says God’s unlimited power is unintelligible. 
 19 Descartes claims that we sometimes clearly and distinctly perceive the truths of mathematics to be necessary (AT VII.65), and by 
his truth rule, what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true. Furthermore, Descartes’s ontological argument presupposes true and 
immutable natures; the meditator’s thought does not impose necessity, but the necessity of the things determines the meditator’s 
thought. See Curley (1984: 571–574).
 20 See Curley (1984); cf. Geach (1973). Support for an approach utilizing iterated modalities can be found in a letter to Mesland, where 
Descartes appears to make the scope distinction between 1) God wills that necessarily 2 + 2 = 4 and 2) Necessarily, God wills that 2 
+ 2 = 4 (2 May, 1644, AT IV.118–119).
 21 See Curley (1988: 42). For criticism, see Van Cleve (1994).
 22 See especially E1p32c1. For a recent survey of the extant literature, see Schmaltz (2018: 77–80). It should be noted that in earlier 
works, Spinoza’s views do not seem so different from Descartes’s: God ‘acts from absolute freedom of the will’ (CM I.12, G I.238), 
and the essences of created things ‘depend on the decree of God alone’ (CM I.3, G I.241). 
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are equal to two right angles’ (E1p17s). There is nothing contingent in nature (E1p29). And to suppose that 
there is a sense in which any of God’s effects could have been otherwise is to suppose, absurdly, that God’s 
essence could have been other than it is (E1p29d, E1p33s2). Nevertheless, for Spinoza, God’s activity is per-
fectly free: freedom is to exist and act from the necessity of one’s own nature alone (E1d7, E1p17c2). Spinoza 
also departs from Descartes in insisting that intellect and will cannot be properly attributed to God as the 
ultimate source of reality.23 ‘An actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire, love, and the like, 
must be referred to natura naturata, not to natura naturans’ (E1p31). In other words, intellect and will must 
be understood as modes, or effects of God’s causal activity, and not ‘such attributes of substance as express 
an infinite and eternal essence, that is (by E1p14c1 and E1p17c2), God, insofar as he is considered as a free 
cause’ (E1p29s). 
Some scholars have observed that Spinoza’s response to Descartes’s view of divine activity is not wholly 
negative: the ‘opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God, and makes all things 
depend on his good pleasure’ (E1p33s) is ‘nearer to the truth’ than the opinion ‘of those who maintain 
that God does all things for the sake of the good’ (E1p32s2).24 For Descartes, God’s infinite will counts as 
‘indifferent’ when nothing determines it to affirm in the way it does.25 For Spinoza, God’s action is neither 
compelled nor prompted (E1p17, E1p17c1). To hold that God acts for the sake of the good would be objec-
tionable to both Descartes and Spinoza because it seems to put an external constraint on the expression of 
God’s power.26 
I want to call attention to another point of agreement. Despite differences in their views of God and 
causation,27 Spinoza and Descartes both hold that some of the things God causes are both eternal and nec-
essary: for Descartes, the eternal truths and true and immutable natures; for Spinoza, the modes that are 
‘infinite and eternal’ and ‘exist necessarily’ (E1p21–23). As just mentioned, scholars have read stretches of 
Part I, particularly E1p17s, as involving criticisms of the notions of divine freedom, necessity, intellect, and 
will figuring in Descartes’s Creation Doctrine. My starting question is whether Spinoza could have discerned 
other shortcomings of the Creation Doctrine. Can the ‘infinite mode’ propositions be understood as part of 
Spinoza’s attempt to provide a better account of God’s causation of eternal and necessary things? 
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. In Section II, I present a series of issues, besides the more familiar 
issues concerning modality and divine freedom, that are unclear, unresolved, or problematic in Descartes’s 
discussion of God’s creation of eternal truths. Some questions that can be asked of Descartes concern the 
range of the Creation Doctrine: does God freely cause all eternal, necessary truths? Does the Creation 
Doctrine really make room for any non-necessary truths? Other questions concern the ontology of the eter-
nal truths and true and immutable natures. What sort of reality do these creations enjoy and where are 
they? I will not say much about whether, or how, Descartes himself might answer these questions. Instead, I 
argue in Sections III and IV that passages in the Ethics, from E1p16 through the ‘infinite mode’ propositions 
E1p21–23, make clear how Spinoza would answer analogous questions in his own system. 
In Section IV, I provide a reconstruction of the hard-to-follow demonstrations of E1p21–23. On my read-
ing, the entities under discussion in E1p21–23 do not constitute a special subclass of God’s modes—rather, 
the point Spinoza seeks to establish in those propositions is that each and every effect of an infinite and 
eternal God is an infinite and eternal mode. For Spinoza, all of an infinite and eternal God’s effects are true 
and immutable natures or eternal truths, and these effects are modes of God. 
 23 Spinoza agrees with Descartes that if intellect is thought to pertain to the divine nature, then ‘the intellect and will which would 
constitute God’s essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, and could not agree with them in anything 
except the name’—no more, Spinoza continues, than a barking dog resembles Sirius, the Dog Star (E1p17s). See CM II.7 (G I.261) for 
another echo of Descartes’s claim that a divine will cannot be understood in terms of a human will (AT VII.432–433). For discussion 
of the Sirius passage, see Koyré (1950) and Gueroult (1968: I.272–295). For a study of the lack of univocity in both Descartes and 
Spinoza, see Schmaltz (2000).
 24 See Nadler (2010: 231).
 25 See AT VII.431–443.
 26 See E1p33s2. For Descartes, eternal truths are not supposed to be external constraints: they are not ‘known by God in any way that 
would imply that they are true independently of him’ (Letter to Mersenne, 6 May 1630, AT I.149). To claim that eternal truths are 
independent of God would be to talk of God ‘as if He were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject Him to the Styx and the Fates’ (Letter to 
Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I.145). The thesis that eternal truths are uncreated and independent of God would be objectionable to 
Descartes for another reason: it would make finite human minds too much like God’s mind. Human thinking and divine thinking 
would be constrained in the same ways, where these ways would be perfectly intelligible to human minds.
 27 For example, Spinoza’s God can be understood under the attribute of extension (E1p11, E1p15s1), and is—as a non-transcendent 
God—the immanent cause of all things (E1p18).
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Although I think this take on the ‘infinite modes’ makes sense against the backdrop of the Creation 
Doctrine and its difficulties, I acknowledge that it does raise big questions. Importantly, if we understand 
E1p21–23 as I do, then there cannot be the kind of special infinite mode (or set of infinite modes) that other 
interpreters have invoked to rescue Spinoza from inconsistency. No infinite mode can serve as a causal link 
between the infinite and eternal God and things with ‘finite and determinate existence’ (E1p28).28 But if 
the infinite and eternal God cannot be understood as the cause of the finite, non-eternal things of E1p28, 
then how can Spinoza coherently insist that God is the cause of all things? In the concluding Section V, after 
addressing one textual worry, I briefly sketch how I think Spinoza avoids inconsistency.
II
When confronted with Descartes’s Creation Doctrine, other questions, besides those concerning modality, 
come to mind. Does God cause every eternal truth, or are there some uncreated, or uncaused, eternal truths? 
Are laws of motion created eternal truths? Is the Creation Doctrine consistent with Descartes’s insistence 
that not all truths are necessary? And how are we to understand the reality these creations enjoy? 
II.1. Question 1: Does God cause necessary, eternal truths about God?
In his 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne, the eternal truths Descartes mentions are those ‘mathematical 
truths you [Mersenne] call eternal’ (AT I.145). In the next letter to Mersenne, Descartes offers a specific exam-
ple: the Euclidean common notion, the whole is greater than its part (AT I.151).29 A longer list of eternal truths 
appears in the Principles. In addition to mathematical and geometrical truths, the class of eternal truths 
includes logical truths like it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, conceptual 
truths like he who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks, and (synthetic) a priori truths like what is done can-
not be undone and nothing comes from nothing. Descartes does not give more specific examples here, and 
even says no additional examples need be supplied: so long as one is not blinded by preconceptions [nullis 
praejudiciis excaecamur], one will recognize eternal truths as eternal truths when one reflects on them (AT 
VIIIA.23–24; cf. AT VII.135). 
A first question regarding the range of the Creation Doctrine is whether it is so unrestricted that even 
truths about God fall under its scope.30 
Sometimes Descartes implies that although truths concerning God’s nature are especially secure and must 
be true in any alternative scenario, such eternal truths are outside the scope of the Creation Doctrine. As 
Descartes writes to Mersenne,
You ask also what necessitated God to create these [eternal] truths; and I reply that he was free to 
make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal—just as free as he was not to create the 
world. And it is certain that these truths are no more necessarily attached to his essence than are 
other created things. (27 May 1630, AT I.152)
God’s essence is an eternal truth (letter to Mersenne, 6 May 1630, AT I.150). Truths concerning God’s essence 
are necessarily ‘attached to God’s essence,’ so these truths are necessary, but not because they are created 
eternal truths God willed to be necessary.31 
However, according to other passages, the Creation Doctrine looks completely unrestricted: all truths are 
the efficient causal effects of God’s free and indifferent will. In the Sixth Replies, Descartes writes, 
 28 As will become clearer later on, I think the eternal ‘formal essences’ (E2p8) are ‘infinite modes,’ but I will part company with others 
(e.g., Garrett 2009) who also think formal essences are infinite modes on a few points. First, I will suggest that Spinoza thinks that 
God, considered as the infinite and eternal Spinozistic substance, cannot be coherently cognized as the infinite and eternal cause 
of two kinds of modes, some infinite and eternal and others non-eternal and finite (or indefinite). Second, I do not think there is 
an ‘infinite mode’ that is all things enjoying ‘finite and determinate’ reality (i.e., the things described in E1p28) taken together as 
a whole. 
 29 Presumably we can also include the other Euclidean common notions, including if equals are taken from equals, the remainders are 
equal. See letter to Plempius, end of December 1637 (AT I.476).
 30 See Frankfurt (1977) and Bennett (1994) for interpretations according to which all eternal truths are created eternal truths.
 31 For discussion, see Wells (1982). For other interpretations according to which there are some necessary truths that are absolutely 
necessary truths exempted from the Creation Doctrine, see Gueroult (1968), Funkenstein (1975), and Ishiguro (1986). Curley 
(1984) also proposes a distinction between a) necessarily necessary eternal truths concerning God and b) eternal truths which are 
necessary but not necessarily necessary.
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it is contradictory [repugnat] to suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from eternity 
with respect to everything which has happened or will ever happen; for it is impossible to suppose 
that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or action or 
omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so. I am not speaking here of temporal 
priority: I mean that there is not even any priority of order, or nature, or of ‘rationally determined 
reason’ as they call it, such that God’s idea of the good impelled him to choose one thing rather than 
another. (AT VII.431–432)32 
God’s indifferent will is indifferent because it is not conditioned by any antecedent ideas. The passage just 
quoted suggests there is no idea, no truth, in the divine intellect prior to God’s act of will—perhaps not even 
an idea, or truth, about God’s own essence and existence.33
II.2. Question 2: Are laws of motion eternal truths? 
A second question regarding the range of the Creation Doctrine is whether Descartes’s laws of motion—his 
law of inertia, law of rectilinear motion, and law governing the transfer of motion at collision—count among 
the eternal truths created by God.34 
Although Descartes does not name the laws of motion on his lists of eternal truths, one might think that 
he means to include them. For example, in The Treatise on Light, Descartes says the mathematical eternal 
truths and his laws of motion are such that we ‘cannot but judge them to be infallible when we conceive 
them distinctly, nor doubt that if God had created several worlds, they would be as true in all of them as they 
are in this one’ (AT XI.47. Cf. AT VI.43). The modal status of the mathematical truths and the laws of motion 
appear to be the same, which might lead one to think that their etiology is the same: they are all eternal 
truths that are not ‘necessarily attached’ to God’s essence, but are rather those created by God. Furthermore, 
Descartes includes motion in the Fifth Meditation discussion of the ‘true and immutable’ natures, or ‘immu-
table and eternal’ essences: ‘There are countless particular features regarding shape, number, motion, and 
so on, which I perceive when I give them my attention’ (AT VII.63–64, my emphasis). Fundamental laws 
describing how motion must be appear to be grouped with eternal truths about geometry and mathematics 
(see also Principles II, article 64, AT VIIIA.78–79). 
But there is also evidence to suggest that we should not classify the laws of motion as created eternal 
truths.35 In the Principles, Descartes elucidates the nature or essence of motion before he ‘proves’ the laws 
of motion. The nature of motion is ‘the transfer of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the 
other bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicin-
ity of other bodies’ (AT VIIIA.53). According to Descartes, the essences of things are eternal truths (letter to 
Mersenne, 27 May 1630, AT I.152).36 This suggests that the eternal truths concerning motion are not the 
laws of motion (which are presented as part of a discussion of the primary cause of motion, God), but rather 
truths like there is no motion without translation or there is no motion in a universe with only one body.37
There is another apparent difference between the eternal truths and the laws of motion. Consider 
Descartes’s proof of the law that if a moving body A collides with another body B, and A’s power of continuing 
in a straight line is greater than the resistance of B, then A carries B along with it and loses a quantity of motion 
equal to what it imparts to B (AT VIIIA.65). This is proven not by appealing to a timeless divine decree, but 
rather by appealing to the ‘immutability of the workings of God,’ God’s conservation of the world ‘by the 
selfsame activity by which he once created it’:38
 32 Cf. the 29 July 1648 letter to Arnauld (AT V.224): ‘every reason [ratio] for truth and goodness depends on [God’s] omnipotence.’
 33 Problems arise for Descartes, however, if the doctrine is completely unrestricted. For example, if truths about God are created 
truths, then the truth God exists has a cause: namely, God’s own free and indifferent will. This, however, appears to conflict with 
Descartes’s claim that although all things have a cause or reason (causa sive ratio) for existence, God needs no cause to exist. Given 
such problems, it seems that Descartes probably did not mean for the doctrine to apply to truths about God’s nature. For discus-
sion, see Wells (1982) and Schmaltz (2002: 90–92).
 34 See Principles II, articles 37, 39, and 40. For the assumption that the Creation Doctrine applies to these laws, see Curley (1984: 573), 
Osler (1985: 353–354), Wilson (1978: 136), Kenny (1968: 178) and (1970: 698–699).
 35 Kemp Smith (1952), Williams (1978), and Ishiguro (1986) leave room for the possibility that the laws of motion are not eternal 
truths, although Ishiguro holds that the laws of motion are not necessary. Broughton (1987) argues that before the Meditations, 
Descartes thought the laws of motion were eternal truths, but changed his view afterwards (cf. Dutton 1996).
 36 For discussion, see Chappell (1997: 124–125) and Schmaltz (1991).
 37 Broughton (1987) makes this point.
 38 That is, the distinction between initial creation and subsequent conservation is a distinction of reason. See also AT VII.49 and AT 
VIIIA.30.
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…. since he conserves the world by the selfsame activity and in accordance with the selfsame laws 
as when he created it, he … conserve[s] motion as something which is mutually transferred when 
collisions occur. (AT VIIIA.66)
Bodies always have moved and always will move in certain ways because God continually acts in the same 
way. The mathematical eternal truths, in contrast, are not true because God is conserving anything: it is suf-
ficient for God to simply create the eternal truths.39 
It also seems the eternal truths are truths about essential properties of extension, while laws of motion 
are not.40 One cannot conceive of a wooden block unless one conceives of it as six-sided and as capable of 
motion, but one need not conceive of the block as actually in motion, or indeed as moving in ways required 
by Cartesian laws of motion.41 
II.3. Question 3: Are any truths not necessary? 
One can also ask a third question: can Descartes even treat the eternal, necessary truths created by God as a 
special subclass of truths? Descartes does not want all truths to be eternal, necessary truths, but on one (at 
least initially attractive) way of reading the Creation Doctrine, it is hard to see how he can avoid saying that 
all truths are necessary. 
In his 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne, Descartes writes,
It will be said that if God had established these truths he could change them as a king changes his 
laws. To this the answer is: Yes, he can, if his will can change. ‘But I understand them to be eternal 
and immutable.’ —I make the same judgment about God. ‘But his will is free.’ —Yes, but his power is 
incomprehensible. (AT I.145–146; cf. AT V.166, AT VII.380) 
Here we seem to get an explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths: they are necessarily true because 
they are created by God’s immutable will.42 As Menn puts it, ‘because God is immutable in his actions as well 
as his being, what he establishes as true at any moment he will establish as true at every moment’43 (2002: 
352).
Kaufman (2005) has dubbed this common interpretation the ‘Immutability Interpretation,’ and observes 
that the premises 1) God wills the eternal truths and 2) God’s will is immutable only yield the conclusion 3) 
the eternal truths are immutable if we assume that if God’s omnipotent will is immutable, effects of that will 
are also immutable.44 Immutability is not equivalent to necessity, however, so yet another principle linking 
immutability to necessity needs to be assumed: for any x, if x is immutable, then x is necessary (2005: 7). 
Although this explains the necessity of the eternal truths, Kaufman argues that it only does so at the cost of 
necessitarianism. 
The following is why necessitarianism is a risk. For Descartes, all things are effects of the immutable divine 
will: ‘there is always a single identical and perfectly simple act by means of which [God] simultaneously 
understands, wills, and accomplishes everything. When I say “everything” I mean all things’ (Principles I.23, 
AT VIIIA.14). Indeed, God 
 39 But see Della Rocca (1999) for the suggestion that there is a closer analogy between God’s creation of the eternal truths and God’s 
causation of motion: there are eternal essences created by God that ground the laws of motion, just as there are eternal essences 
created by God that ground the eternal truths. As Della Rocca notes, however, this is in tension with the Cartesian thesis that the 
essence of body is extension alone (1999: 69).
 40 For discussion, see Broughton (1987).
 41 It may seem that the modal status of the laws of motion is explained by the immutability of God’s activity, but this may not be the 
case. See Kaufman (2005: 15) for an argument that immutability explains why there are the laws of motion there are, but not why 
they are necessary. Dutton (1996) claims that while God has perfect freedom of indifference to create or not create laws of motion, 
given the creation of the laws, God must create only those laws that are consistent with God’s immutability. The content of the 
eternal truths, in contrast, is not tied to God’s immutability.
 42 Descartes explains the necessity of the laws of nature in terms of the immutability of divine action (see AT XI.43). If we think the 
laws of nature are eternal truths, and we note that the laws of nature are necessary because of the immutability of God’s will, then 
we may think that immutability could also be the ground of the other eternal truths.
 43 Cf. Curley (1984: 588); Nadler (1987: 176).
 44 See AT XI.43 and AT VIIIA.61 for some textual support. Kaufman admits that it is not entirely clear from these passages that 
Descartes subscribes to this ‘Transfer of Immutability Principle.’
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would not be supremely perfect if anything could happen in the world without coming entirely 
from him …. philosophy by itself is able to discover that the slightest thought could not enter into 
a person’s mind without God’s willing, and having willed from all eternity, that it should so enter.45 
(Letter to Elisabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV.314)
Furthermore, God does not change his immutable will in response to petitionary prayers: we pray ‘sim-
ply to obtain whatever he has, from all eternity, willed to be obtained by our prayers’ (AT IV 315–316; cf. 
Conversation with Burman, AT V.66).
The truths concerning particular human actions, thoughts, and prayers could be immutable effects of an 
immutable will if they are indexed or ordered: God’s providence would then be God’s eternally and immu-
tably willing an infinity of, say, temporally indexed truths. If, however, we assume the principle that immu-
table truths are necessary truths, then those indexed immutable truths turn out to be necessary truths.46 
And so a potential tension in the Cartesian system shows itself. If we adopt an (at least initially plausible) 
interpretation of the foundations of the necessity of the eternal truths, then it looks like Descartes is com-
mitted to all truths being necessary truths, a conclusion that conflicts with his assertions that some truths 
are contingent.47
II.4. Question 4: What—and where—are eternal truths?
In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes points to two kinds of eternal entities. First, there is essentially eternally 
existing God: ‘it is quite evident that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than the 
fact that its three angles equal two right angles can be separated from the essence of a triangle (AT VII.66). 
And, the Meditator says later, ‘after supposing that one God exists, I plainly see that it is necessary that he 
has existed from eternity and will remain [sit mansurus] for eternity’ (AT VII.68).48 Second, there are true and 
immutable natures:
… I find within me innumerable ideas of things that even though they may not exist anywhere out-
side me, nonetheless cannot be called nothing; and although they can be thought in some manner 
at will, nonetheless they are not made by me [a me figuntur], but have their own true and immuta-
ble natures. Thus when, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps no such figure exists, or 
has ever existed, anywhere outside my thought, there is still some determinate nature, or essence, 
or form, immutable and eternal, which is not produced by me [a me non effecta est], nor depends on 
my mind [nec a mente mea dependet]. (AT VII.64) 
Here Descartes distinguishes the true and immutable nature of a triangle and actual triangles in the world; 
the true and immutable nature is still something, even if there are no actual triangles (or no extra-mental 
extended world at all). But it also seems the nature does not exist only in the Meditator’s mind: this true and 
immutable nature is not produced by or dependent on his mind. True and immutable natures are eternal 
truths (AT I.152). One could read this passage as evidence that Descartes was a sort of Platonist: God’s eternal, 
necessary effects reside in a kind of (created) Platonic realm.49 
The exchange with Gassendi might also be taken as evidence of Descartes’s Platonism. In the Fifth 
Objections, Gassendi reveals that he takes the Fifth Meditation to concern entities with reality apart from 
human minds, as he objects to there being any true and immutable natures apart from God (AT VII.319).50 
Descartes does not contest this reading of the Fifth Meditation. That Descartes does not correct Gassendi 
 45 Here I set aside the debate about whether Descartes is an incompatibilist or compatibilist regarding human freedom. See Jayasekera 
(2014) for a helpful overview. 
 46 See Kaufman (2005: 10–11).
 47 Kaufman’s own account of the necessity of the eternal truths does not go via God’s immutability: ‘the eternal truths are necessary 
precisely because God wills that they are necessary’ (2005: 17).
 48 The passage from E1p17s concerning God’s omnipotence discussed above seems to echo these passages. Spinoza combines the 
point about God’s necessary existence with the point about properties following with necessity from the essence of a triangle: 
if God’s essence is necessarily eternally real, and all things follow from God’s essence with necessity (as propria follow from the 
essence of a triangle), then all things will be eternally real. It is, then, not just that God exists ‘from eternity and will remain for 
eternity’—all of God’s effects also exist from eternity and will remain for eternity. That is, God’s omnipotence has ‘been actual from 
eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity.’
 49 See Kenny (1970). Gewirth (1970) identifies some Platonism in Descartes’s thinking. Cf. Wilson (1978: 171).
 50 Gassendi advances a view according to which essences do depend on the existence of human beings and their conceptualizing 
activity (AT VII.321).
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suggests that Descartes was thinking of the true and immutable natures as having reality outside of human 
minds (AT VII.380).51 
Elsewhere, however, Descartes’s view looks less Platonic.52 Consider Principles I.49:
When we recognize that it is not possible that something come from nothing, this proposition, noth-
ing comes from nothing, is considered not as some existing thing, nor also as a mode of a thing, but as 
some eternal truth, which resides in our mind… (AT VIIIA.23–24; cf. Principles I.59, AT VIIIA.27–28)
Here Descartes could be read as implying that eternal truths exist only in human minds.53 They are not things 
enjoying either eternal or non-eternal extra-mental existence, nor are they modes of extra-mental things.
Indeed, it is possible to read the Fifth Meditation passage quoted above differently so that it does not 
sound so Platonic. Perhaps eternal truths and true and immutable natures are just the objectively real rep-
resentational contents of innate ideas that only exist in human minds. Granted, there is a sense in which an 
innate idea does depend on the Meditator’s mind: anything that is objectively real depends on a mind in that 
objective reality is the reality ‘by which a thing exists in the intellect by way of an idea’ (AT VII.41). However, 
there is a distinction between ideas whose contents can be constructed and altered by the Meditator’s 
mind—‘factitious’ ideas like those of hippogriffs and sirens—and innate ideas whose contents are unalter-
able by the Meditator (AT VII.37–38). Both factitious and innate ideas can be thought of ‘in some way at will,’ 
but innate ideas cannot be modified at will.54 So the true and immutable nature of a triangle, as the content 
of an innate idea, can be thought of at will and is, as an objectively real object, ‘not nothing’ (AT VII.41, AT 
VII.65), but it is not dependent on the Meditator’s mind in the sense that the Meditator did not construct 
that content. 
However, it cannot be that all true and immutable natures are such that they are only the objectively real 
contents of innate ideas: the true and immutable nature of God is an objectively real object of an innate 
idea in the Meditator’s mind, but it is also a formally real something—that is, God himself—existing outside 
of the Meditator’s mind.55 
Some commentators, recognizing that Descartes’s texts pull in different directions, have suggested that 
perhaps Descartes subscribed to a ‘moderate’ Platonism: the eternal truths are created by God and external 
to human minds, but these truths are not external to God. These eternal truths can be understood as in the 
divine mind as objectively real contents of divine decrees.56 They can still count as products of God’s causal 
activity, as a formally real mind can cause the objective reality of ideas within that mind (see AT VII.43–45). 
But such moderate Platonic readings might not fit with Descartes’s claims that eternal truths are distinct 
from God.57 Descartes says the eternal truths ‘are no more necessarily attached to [God’s] essence than are 
other created things’ (AT I.152); if eternal truths and true and immutable natures are in the divine mind, 
then they do seem more attached to God than ‘other created things.’
III
According to Descartes, God’s effects are diversified: some effects are non-eternal and non-necessary, others 
are eternal and necessary. But with diversification come questions. Questions of which eternal truths are to 
be explained by the Creation Doctrine arise because it seems not everything that is eternal and necessary 
is eternal and necessary for the same reason. As I explained above, even if some eternal, necessary truths 
 51 See Rozemond (2008). Hattab (2016) proposes that Descartes’s view of eternal truths is indebted to Proclus’s (Neoplatonic) view of 
universals.
 52 In the Principles, Descartes advances a view according to which eternal truths, essences, and all universals do not enjoy reality 
outside of thought. See AT VIIIA.27–30. Cf. AT IV.349–50.
 53 See Gueroult (1974: II.277) and Nolan (1997).
 54 See AT VII.117–118, AT VII.64, AT VII.189. See Carriero (2009: 314–315) and Schmaltz (2014) for discussion.
 55 For further discussion of whether the true and immutable nature of God is to be distinguished from the true and immutable 
natures of other things, see Cunning (2010: ch. 6) and Schmaltz (2017).
 56 See Rozemond (2008). Schmaltz (1991) also gives a ‘moderate’ reading but suggests that the natures and truths are to be identified 
with the divine decrees. 
 57 Moderate Platonism may also conflict with divine simplicity (see Nolan 1997: esp. fn. 13; Kaufman 2003). For discussion of the idea 
that there is a distinction of reason between the objectively real eternal truths in God’s mind and God’s essence, see Rozemond 
(2008). In discussing the Creation Doctrine, Descartes often emphasizes the incomprehensibility of God and God’s activity (see 
AT I.146, AT IV.118, AT VII.436). Given this incomprehensibility, it may be that moderate Platonic readings do fit with Descartes’s 
claims that eternal truths are distinct from God—it is just that we cannot grasp the nature of this distinction (thanks to Michael 
Della Rocca for this point). 
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depend on the creative activity of God’s free and indifferent will, it looks like truths about God’s nature are 
eternal and necessary because they are propria following with necessity from the divine essence. And laws of 
nature might seem to presuppose, in a way other eternal, necessary truths do not, the immutability of divine 
causation. However, there is a worry that if immutability is the source of all necessity, then all truths are 
necessary. Questions about ontological status also arise: if one emphasizes the eternality of eternal truths, 
then it becomes harder to understand the sense in which they are distinct from God, but if one emphasizes 
their distinctness from God, it becomes harder to understand the sense in which they are eternal (and not 
just part of the non-eternal world).58
It is accepted that the Creation Doctrine is in the background of what Spinoza says in E1p17 and its scho-
lium.59 In the next two sections, I suggest that other texts in that same stretch of the Ethics can also be read 
as composed with Descartes’s Creation Doctrine—and the questions it raises—in mind. I argue that Spinoza 
offers a radically simple alternative account of God’s free causal activity: an eternal and infinite God’s effects 
cannot be diversified in the ways Descartes thought they could be.
To begin, consider E1p16: ‘From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many 
things in infinitely many modes [modus] (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect).’ Setting 
aside the terminology of mode, it is first worth noting that this proposition echoes a passage in Descartes’s 
6 May 1630 letter to Mersenne: ‘The existence of God is the first and the most eternal of all possible truths 
and the one from which alone all others proceed’ (AT I.150, my emphasis). Descartes goes on to say that ‘the 
eternal truths are no more necessarily attached to [God’s] essence than are other created things’ (27 May 
1630), a statement which, as I sketched in Section II.1, can be taken to indicate that certain eternal truths—
that is, truths that are necessary consequences of God’s necessarily existing essence—are not caused by God. 
E1p16 removes any question of where Spinoza might stand on the issue. Everything is ‘necessarily attached’ 
to God’s essence: everything follows with necessity from God’s essence as propria of God’s essence. But that 
there is such necessary attachment does not mean that God is not a cause of these things (E1p16c1–3).60 It 
also does not mean that God’s causation is not free—rather, for Spinoza, having all of one’s effects necessi-
tated by one’s own nature alone is the epitome of free action (E1def7, E1p17c2). So it is clear that necessary 
truths about God’s own nature are, for Spinoza, caused by God. Indeed, all truths—‘whatever can fall under 
an infinite intellect’—are caused by God. We thus have Spinoza’s answer to Question 1.
All truths includes necessary truths concerning the motion of bodies (e.g., the lemmata in the ‘Physical 
Digression’ after E2p13), so these truths are also caused by God.61 And so we have Spinoza’s answer to 
Question 2. In E1p33s2, Spinoza even says that the non-Spinozistic (presumably Cartesian) freedom others 
attribute to God is a great ‘obstacle’ [obstaculum] to scientia. It is not clear what sort of obstacle Spinoza has 
in mind here, or whether scientia is to be taken to be demonstrative knowledge from first principles or the 
kind of certain knowledge Descartes thinks we can have once we know that a benevolent God is the creator 
of our nature. 
Perhaps the obstacle is an obstacle to scientia taken in the first sense. Descartes sometimes appears to sug-
gest that mathematical laws are freely created eternal truths but laws of physics are not; the laws of physics 
are necessary consequences of God’s immutable, necessarily existing nature, but God could have created 
different mathematical laws—God ‘was free to make it not true at all that the radii of the circle are equal’ (AT 
I.152). Depending on one’s understanding of the modal status of Cartesian eternal truths, one could think 
that laws of physics are thus more necessary than laws of mathematics. But one might also think that this 
is a mistake: if there are grades of necessity, the laws of mathematics are the more necessary laws.62 Or one 
could think it is a mistake to think there are grades of necessity at all: laws of physics and laws of mathemat-
ics are equally inexorable. Perhaps the hope of systematic, demonstrative science based on first principles 
is dashed if physics is thought to be more necessary than math, or if it is thought that there are grades of 
necessity. Perhaps these mistaken thoughts lead to more mistaken thoughts about which principles are the 
‘first principles,’ or how demonstrations are to proceed. 
 58 See De Rosa (2011) for discussion and Schmaltz (2017) for elaboration of how this tension is handled by Malebranche, Arnauld, and 
Régis.
 59 See, e.g., Schmaltz (2018).
 60 Descartes held that the eternal truths were created ‘from eternity’ (ab aeterno). See AT I.152 and AT VII.436. Yet creation and ‘from 
eternity’ seem to be in tension: how could something have been created if it is created from eternity? Descartes is comfortable with 
this tension: our finite human minds simply cannot understand how to square creation and eternality (see, e.g., AT VII.380).
 61 By the Physical Digression, I think Spinoza has shifted to discussing what is not eternal; the bodies under discussion in the digres-
sion are not conceived to be true and immutable natures, but rather to be actual things enduring over time. See the conclusion.
 62 For more discussion of this point regarding the Creation Doctrine and laws of physics, see Broughton (1987) and Nadler (1987).
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We can also see why Spinoza might have thought Descartes’s take on divine freedom is an obstacle to 
scientia, taken in the second (Cartesian) sense as the greatest certainty. Descartes argued that once a person 
knows a benevolent God exists and is the creator of her nature, she can be certain that she is not deceived 
in the things that seem most evident to her; she can know that her clear and distinct ideas are true. A 
benevolent God would not have created her with a deceptive nature.63 But if the essences of things—includ-
ing the essence of the human mind—are eternal truths created by the perfectly indifferent will of God (letter 
to Mersenne, 27 May 1630, AT I.152), then it seems there is no antecedent reason why God created human 
minds with one kind of nature rather than another.64 How, then, can Descartes consistently say that consid-
erations of goodness guided God’s creation of human nature?65 
Spinoza is concerned to argue that all of God’s effects are necessary. It is not controversial to attribute this 
argumentative aim to Spinoza, since most scholars take Spinoza’s statements that ‘in nature there is nothing 
contingent’ (E1p29) and ‘things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order 
than they have been produced’ (E1p33) to be avowals of necessitarianism: if all things follow with necessity 
from the necessarily existing divine nature, then there cannot be a bifurcation of divine effects into some 
that are necessary and some that are not. So the answer to Question 3 is an easy one: Spinoza thinks all 
truths are necessary. 
However, I do not think Spinoza merely wants to establish that there are no contingent truths and no 
unactualized possibilia. That is a thesis merely about the modal status of effects, and is consistent with some 
of an eternal God’s necessary effects being non-eternal.66 I think Spinoza also wants to conclude that all of an 
eternal God’s effects are real in the non-temporal way eternal truths or true and immutable natures are real.
A first passage to consider is E1p17s:
I have shown clearly enough (E1p16) that from God’s supreme power, that is, infinite nature, infi-
nitely many things in infinitely many ways [modis], that is, all things, have necessarily flowed, or 
always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, 
from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. So God’s omnipo-
tence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, 
at least in my opinion, God’s omnipotence is maintained far more perfectly. (G II.62, my emphasis)
Spinoza is drawing a parallel here between the essence of a triangle and the essence of God. Of course, it is 
only God’s nature that exists by nature (E1p11). But the cases are otherwise alike. God’s existence, ‘like the 
essence of a thing, is conceived as an eternal truth, and on that account cannot be explained by duration 
or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end’ (E1def8).67 The essence of the 
triangle is also conceived as an eternal truth. Spinoza can expect his readers to readily agree that given the 
essence of a triangle, other truths necessarily follow; ‘by the same necessity and in the same way,’ Spinoza 
explains, everything follows from God’s essence.
Commentators tend to emphasize the necessity of what follows from these natures. Note, however, that 
Spinoza does not just say that the necessity is the same: things follow ‘by the same necessity and in the same 
way.’ The italicized phrase might be argumentatively inert—but it is also possible that it is not. If not, what 
other feature of the following-from in the triangle case might Spinoza be pointing to?
Here is a simple answer. In the triangle case, what follows from the true and immutable nature of the tri-
angle is also an eternal truth; whatever reality the essence of the triangle enjoys is the same reality that these 
necessary consequences enjoy. Likewise, the reality the essence of God enjoys—‘existence itself,’ conceived 
 63 See AT VII.69, 71,77–78,141. See also Spinoza’s discussion of Cartesian scientia in G I.146–149.
 64 There would also not be any antecedent reason why God would create human minds with one idea of God rather than another. I 
return to the idea of God in Section IV. 
 65 See VII.61. See my ‘Scientia intuitiva in the Ethics’ (2017) for an argument that Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva (E2p40s2) also secures 
the greatest certainty, albeit without appeal to any thesis of God’s benevolence. Rather, certainty is secured by the thesis that one 
and the same thing can be considered either as a representation of a body (i.e., an objectively real body) or a formally real body 
(i.e., the idea’s ideatum). See my “Ideas of Ideas and Knowing that one Knows” (forthcoming-b) for further defense of the thesis that 
E2p43 (“he who has a true idea at the same time knows [scit] that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing”) is 
compatible with scientia intuitiva securing certainty that reason cannot.
 66 To be clear, most scholars of Spinoza (myself included) think that Spinoza’s God’s eternity is not sempiternity, but see Donagan 
(1973) and Kneale (1973) for discussion. Most also think that, for Spinoza, at least some of an eternal God’s effects are non-eternal. 
In this essay, I explain why I disagree with the majority on the latter point. 
 67 Cf. Descartes’s claim in his 7 May 1630 letter to Mersenne that the essences of created things are eternal truths (AT I.152).
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‘as an eternal truth’—is the reality that everything that follows from God’s essence enjoys. The reality of all of 
God’s effects is reality ‘conceived as an eternal truth.’ 
On the one hand, this makes sense: all of substance’s modes are modifications of substance’s eternal real-
ity. A wrinkle in the carpet is carpet, so a mode of eternal reality is eternal reality. But on the other hand, one 
might complain that it cannot be right that all of an eternal God’s effects are eternal. After all, the things 
with ‘finite and determinate’ existence that Spinoza will mention in E1p28 are not eternal yet are still called 
‘modes.’ All modes are caused by God. So Spinoza could not have meant that all of God’s effects are eternal.
I will return to the question of how the entities described in E1p28 fit into Spinoza’s system at the end of 
the essay. For now, I want to see what happens if we do not adjust our understanding of E1p17s in light of 
this later passage. 
The first thing to note is that if we think Spinoza’s theorizing is guided by the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, then we can expect Spinoza to argue that all of an eternal God’s effects must be eternally real. If the 
one and only substance, properly considered under any attribute, exists in a timelessly eternal way, what 
reason could there be for this eternal substance to cause some effects that are eternal and some effects that 
are non-eternal?68 
Also note that if all of God’s effects are eternal truths, then a straightforward reading of Spinoza’s state-
ment in E1p17s that God’s omnipotence has been ‘actual from eternity’ and will ‘remain in the same actual-
ity to eternity’ becomes available. The ‘same actuality’ can be read as literally the same actuality: the infinity 
of God’s effects—everything that is possible—are all always actual.69 
God’s omnipotence is maintained ‘far more perfectly’ if God’s essence—and all that follows from God’s 
essence—are all always fully actual.70 If some of God’s effects were non-eternal and only existed for some 
limited time, then there would be times at which it is true that God has not (yet) created things that are in 
his power to create; this is so, even if it is necessary that God (eventually) cause those non-eternal effects. 
But if God’s effects are all real in the way eternal truths are real, then there is no such time at which this 
is true.71 
One might complain that this is to misunderstand eternal truths. One might say that it follows from the 
nature of an eternal God that some thing x will come to be at some time and enjoy non-eternal reality for a 
period of time. It is always true that x is non-eternally, durationally actual; an infinite intellect always has an 
idea representing x as durationally actual, and this idea is true because x does, for a time, enjoy durational 
actuality. The truth-maker for an eternal truth need not exist as something eternal. 
I think Spinoza would resist this model, however, since it conflicts with his doctrine of parallelism.72 For 
the infinite intellect’s idea of x to be true, it must agree with its object [ideatum] (see E1a6 and E2p32). But 
a true idea of x (a representation of x, which is x as objectively real) and x (the formally real ideatum) are one 
 68 Although my conclusions may differ from theirs, I agree with other scholars in thinking that Spinoza rejects bifurcations of reality 
that threaten intelligibility. See, for example, Della Rocca (2007), Melamed (2013: 95–104), and Perler (2018: 232). For the role(s) 
of the PSR in Spinoza’s Ethics, see Della Rocca (2003, 2008, 2015), Garber (2015), Lin (2007, 2012, 2018), Newlands (2018a). 
 69 ‘Actual’ here is actuality sub specie aeternitatis. When one conceives of things as actual, or real, in this way, one conceives them ‘to 
be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature’ (E5p29s).
 70 If this is right, then Spinoza can be read as defending the thesis that the entirety of God’s being—God and all of God’s modes—is 
immutable (cf. G I.178–179, G I.255–256). More traditional theologians held that if God had modes, God would be mutable, but if 
God’s modes are all eternal, then the presence of modes does not entail mutability. For discussion of the issue of divine immutabil-
ity in Spinoza and the tradition, see Carriero (1995: 263–267).
 71 Descartes had said that there is ‘always a single identical and perfectly simple act by means of which [God] simultaneously under-
stands, wills, and accomplishes everything. When I say ‘everything’ I mean all things’ (AT VIIIA.14. Cf. Spinoza’s mention in E1p17s 
of those who assert that ‘God’s intellect, will, and power are one and the same.’ Cf. G I.261–263). A human being may have rea-
sons to believe that this is true (e.g., perhaps because it is a tenet of faith), but it seems there is an irremovable mystery here. As 
mentioned in note 60, it is hard to see how an eternal God could create effects that are also eternal. Furthermore, one can wonder 
how a timelessly eternal God creates eternal effects and effects that only endure for some period of time by a ‘single identical and 
perfectly simple act.’ God’s causation is seemingly more intelligible if all of God’s effects are eternally real and follow as propria 
follow from an essence.
 72 I read E2p7, ‘the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things,’ to be a thesis about true ideas. 
Yet there is a difference between a true representation of, say, a circle with specific dimensions Q as something eternal (the “true 
and immutable nature” of a circle) and a true representation of circle with specific dimensions Q as something enduring (that which 
came to be on a certain page at a certain time). While I cannot defend it here, I think Spinoza makes this point in E2p8–E2p9: the 
order and connection of ideas of eternal truths is the same as the order and connection of eternal truths, and the order and con-
nection of ideas of enduring things is the same as the order and connection of enduring things. In each case, the representational 
parallelism is due to the “one and the sameness” of objecta and ideata. In the conclusion, I return to the question of how eternal 
truths and enduring things fit into Spinoza’s monist framework. 
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and the same thing considered in different ways (see E2p7c and E2p7d). If there is no formally real ideatum, 
then there is no true idea. So if x is not always formally real, then it seems there cannot always be a true idea 
of it. If the ideatum x has eternal formal reality, however, then it will always be the case that an (adequate) 
idea of x is true. And there will always be a true idea of x in the infinite intellect.73
To take stock, Descartes held that many necessary truths are not necessarily attached to God’s necessar-
ily existing nature and are, along with contingent truths, products of God’s perfectly free creative activity. 
Spinoza argues that all of God’s effects are necessarily attached to God’s necessarily existing nature—and 
thus freely caused by God. We can understand this argument as part of a criticism of the Creation Doctrine. 
Read in this context, I have suggested that perhaps Spinoza did not just mean for us to recognize the neces-
sity of all the effects necessarily attached to God’s nature—he also wanted us to recognize that what is neces-
sarily attached to God’s nature is also eternally formally real.
Notice that the next few propositions do put us in a position to see that all of God’s effects are necessary 
as well as eternal. God is the immanent cause of all things (E1p18). If ‘God is eternal, or all of God’s attrib-
utes are eternal’ (E1p19), and attributes are ‘what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its 
essence’ (E1def4), and God’s existence and essence are ‘one and the same’ (E1p20, E1p20c2), then we can 
see that God’s essence is necessarily eternally formally real. All the things necessarily following from the 
divine essence (E1p16) are modes in and immanently caused by the free causal activity of God (E1p15, E1p17, 
E1p18). As modes of a necessarily eternally formally real substance, God’s effects are not only necessary, but 
also enjoy eternal formal reality; each mode is a way that eternal formal reality is.
In the next section, I argue that the point of propositions E1p21–23 is to establish the conclusion that all 
of an eternal, necessarily existing God’s effects are eternal and necessary modes of God.74 But Spinoza also 
draws further conclusions regarding the ontology of God’s eternal and necessary effects (and thus fleshes 
out an answer to Question 4). Not only are all of God’s effects eternal, necessary modes of God (and so are 
not in some created Platonic realm separate from God, as Descartes sometimes seems to suggest); each and 
every one of God’s effects is infinite (where this infinite reality is not indefinite). Indeed, an infinite and eter-
nal God cannot cause anything non-eternal and finite. If this is so, then God’s eternal and necessary effects 
cannot (as Descartes sometimes seems to suggest) reside as innate ideas in finite, non-eternal minds—for 
the simple reason that an infinite and eternal God cannot cause finite, non-eternal minds.75 At the end of 
Section IV, I briefly point out how a new reading of E1p21-23 might clarify some of Spinoza’s perplexing 
claims in Part V of the Ethics.
IV
IV.1. E1p21
To begin, here is E1p21 and the beginning of its famously baroque demonstration: 
1p21: All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always 
had to exist and be infinite, that is, are, through the same attribute, infinite and eternal.
If you deny [that all things following from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes are 
infinite and eternal], then conceive (if you can) that in some attribute of God there follows from 
its absolute nature something that is finite and has a determinate existence, that is, [determinate] 
duration, for example, an idea of God in thought. 
At the beginning of the demonstration, we are asked to conceive that from the eternal attribute of thought 
there follows an idea that is 1) finite and 2) ‘has a determinate existence, that is, duration, for example, an 
idea of God in thought’ (idea Dei in cogitatione). 
 73 Each eternal nature and truth presupposes and implies others; each truth will occupy a distinct node in an infinitely complex 
ordering of all eternal truths. It will thus not be the case that God is both P and not-P at once and in the same respect.
 74 The things discussed in E1p15–18 are all things (that are not God). Propositions E1p19–20 concern God. Note that Spinoza does 
not indicate that E1p21–23 only concern a subclass of God’s effects. 
 75 The ‘moderate’ Platonic readings described in Section II.4, according to which eternal truths are merely objectively real represen-
tations in God’s mind, are also ruled out, but not until the doctrine of parallelism is introduced in Part II. The infinite intellect’s 
adequate representation of, say, the true and immutable nature of a circle (i.e., the nature as objectively real) and the true and 
immutable nature of the circle (i.e., the nature as formally real) are one and the same mode considered under different attributes. 
See Section IV.4 below.
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I propose that the ‘idea Dei in cogitatione’ assumed for reductio in E1p21d is the idea representing the true 
and immutable nature of God (under some attribute) in a finite, non-eternal thinking mind.76 Note that this 
would have been a natural example for Spinoza to put forward: read this way, the idea assumed for reductio 
is an idea very much like that which plays a crucial role in Descartes’s Meditations.
In the Third Meditation, the Meditator uses his idea of God to prove God’s existence: the idea of God has 
infinite objective reality, and such infinite objective reality could only have been caused by a being with infi-
nite formal reality—that is, God, an infinite, eternal, necessarily existing being (AT VII.47). Once the Meditator 
proves that God exists, the Meditator proves, from reflection on his own mind’s limited formal reality, that 
God must be the creator and sustainer of that limited formal reality (AT VII.48–50). The Meditator realizes 
that the idea of God—an idea of what Descartes says elsewhere is the ‘most eternal’ of eternal truths (AT 
I.150)—is innate, and remarks that it is ‘no surprise that God, in creating me, should have placed this idea in 
me to be, as it were, the mark of the craftsman stamped on his work’ (AT VII.51).
So, according to Descartes, God, who enjoys infinite, eternal formal reality, causes something infinite and 
eternal: an eternal truth with infinite objective reality. Yet Descartes’s God also causes something finite and 
non-eternal: the finite, non-eternal formal reality of the Meditator’s mind, in which there is a finite, non-
eternal formally real idea that represents God. 
Spinoza clearly thinks Descartes is wrong to believe God is transcendent (since God’s effects are modes of 
God). In this section, I suggest that Spinoza also thinks Descartes is wrong to believe that an infinite, eter-
nal God causes anything with finite and non-eternal formal reality. Spinoza argues that if we cognize God 
properly, as the one and only substance, we will see that all of God’s effects are infinite and eternal modes. 
So Descartes’s contention that the Meditator’s finite formally real mind is caused by God must be rejected. 
Spinoza can also rule out the possibility, mentioned in Section II.4 above, that eternal truths caused by God 
reside solely in the finite and non-eternal minds caused by God, since such finite and non-eternal minds 
cannot be caused by an infinite and eternal God. At the end of the section, I explain why the possibility, 
also mentioned in II.4, that true and immutable natures and eternal truths reside solely as objectively real 
contents in a divine mind is also untenable, as well as why Spinoza might have said that ‘E1p21 and other 
things’ enable us to see that our mind ‘insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking’ (E5p40s).
E1p21d is broken into two main parts: the first part is supposed to establish that whatever ‘follows from 
the necessity of the absolute nature of an attribute itself must be infinite’; the second part is supposed to 
establish that what follows must be eternal. I take up each in turn. 
…what follows must be infinite
After asking us to conceive of the finite idea Dei, the demonstration continues:
[1.a] Now since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it is necessarily (by E1p11) infinite by 
its nature. But insofar as it is the idea of God, [thought] is supposed to be finite. 
Spinoza reiterates that thought, as an attribute of God, is infinite by nature. Being infinite is ‘an absolute 
affirmation of the existence of some nature’ (E1p8s1); thinking substance is infinite reality, or existence itself 
(E1p7, E1d8), conceived as thinking. Importantly, it does not make sense to conceive of thinking substance’s 
reality being diminished, nor does it make sense to conceive of thinking substance’s reality as admitting of 
augmentation or amplification. To do so would require thinking of substance’s reality in terms of units, but 
this would make substance posterior in nature to the constituent units and would render the infinity of 
substance mere indefinite infinity. Finite reality, in contrast, is that which can be limited by something of the 
same nature (E1d2), and it does make sense to think of such reality in terms of units: we can think that some 
existing finite thing would enjoy more or less reality if other things were there (or not there). 
[1.b] But (by E1d2) [thought] cannot be conceived to be finite unless it is determined through 
thought itself. 
We have assumed for reductio that there is a finite formally real idea of God. As Spinoza reminds us in [1.b], 
to be conceived as finite, its reality must be limited or determined by something that is also thought (E1d2). 
In this demonstration, we are supposing that the only things that exist or are formally real are the infinite 
 76 From E1p20c1, we know that God’s existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth (see also E1p8s2), and from E1p20c2, we know 
that considered under any attribute, God is immutable. In other words, God’s nature—the one substance considered under some 
attribute—is an immutable nature and an eternal truth.
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thinking substance and the finite idea of God.77 These are the only things available to do any limiting, so in 
order for the finite idea of God to be conceived as finite, it must be limited either by itself or by thinking 
substance.
[1.c] But [thought can] not [be determined] through thought itself, insofar as it constitutes the idea 
of God (for to that extent [thought] is supposed to be finite). Therefore, [thought must be deter-
mined] through thought insofar as it does not constitute the idea of God, which nevertheless (by 
E1p11) must necessarily exist. 
‘Thought itself, insofar as it constitutes the idea of God’ can be taken to be thinking substance only insofar 
as it is the idea of God, the mode we are assuming enjoys finite formal reality. So understood, ‘thought 
itself, insofar as it constitutes the idea of God’ cannot determine the idea of God for a simple reason: the 
finite mode cannot determine itself to be finite.78 So it must be determined by something else, or ‘through 
thought insofar as it does not constitute the idea of God’: 
[1.d] Therefore, there is thought which does not constitute the idea of God, and on that account 
the idea of God does not follow necessarily from the nature [of thought] insofar as it is absolute 
thought (for [thought] is conceived as constituting the idea of God and as not constituting it). This 
is contrary to the hypothesis. So if the idea of God in thought, or anything else in any attribute of 
God (for it does not matter what example is taken, since the demonstration is universal), follows 
from the necessity of the absolute nature of the attribute itself, it must necessarily be infinite. This 
was the first thing to be proven. 
Here is one reconstruction of Spinoza’s reasoning in [1.c] and [1.d].79 The entity that limits the finite idea of 
God must 1) not be the finite idea of God itself (because the idea cannot limit itself), 2) be understood under 
the attribute of thought (from E1d2), and 3) be finite (since, in limiting the idea of God, it will also be limited 
by the idea of God, and so is finite, by E1d2). Since we are assuming that the finite idea follows from thinking 
substance alone (without the assumption of any other modes), the only candidate entity that could do any 
limiting would be thinking substance (since again, the finite idea cannot limit itself). But if thinking sub-
stance limits the finite idea, then thinking substance would have to be finite, which is absurd. So something 
that is finite cannot follow from the absolute nature of a divine attribute; what follows must be infinite.80
So reconstructed, this demonstration generalizes to other attributes. The demonstration does not hinge 
on anything particular to the attribute of thought, but just requires that we consider the idea of God as a 
finite, formally real mode of substance considered under an attribute. However, this reconstruction does 
not clearly explain why Spinoza adds that the thought that does not constitute the idea of God nevertheless 
‘must necessarily exist’ (by E1p11) at the end of [1.c]. This, somewhat perplexingly, is a common oversight, 
so common that I have not yet found a reconstruction of E1p21d that explains why Spinoza brings in E1p11 
here.81
Another potential difficulty with this reconstruction is that the absurdity is that substance is both finite 
and infinite; it is not clear how this maps onto Spinoza’s claim that thought is conceived both ‘constituting’ 
and ‘not constituting’ the idea of God. But perhaps we can accommodate this language in the following way: 
thought is conceived as constituting the idea of God when we conceive of the finite idea of God, and con-
ceived as not constituting it when we conceive of what must be posited to limit that idea so that it is finite. 
However, this is not, in itself, absurd. It is only absurd if we supplement this claim with the claims that only 
what is finite can do the limiting, that the only potential limiter of the finite idea is substance, and that that 
substance is necessarily infinite. The text, however, suggests the argument to absurdity is more direct: the 
 77 We have assumed that some finite formal reality (the idea of God) follows from the ‘absolute nature’ of some attribute of God. I am 
taking this to mean that there is no other formally real entity assumed to be in play; we are supposed to focus on substance just as 
‘existence itself.’
 78 Cf. Melamed (2013: 118 fn. 8).
 79 For reconstructions along these lines, see Schmaltz (1997: 214) and Donagan (1988: 103).
 80 Alternatively, for there to be a finite idea, we must already have assumed a finite thing, and so a finite idea cannot follow from the 
substance alone (i.e., from the absolute nature of substance). See Melamed (2013: 117–118) for this reconstruction.
 81 Granted, it is possible that E1p11 does not do much work here. This citation might just be Spinoza’s way of signaling that if the 
finite idea does not limit itself, the only other option is that it is limited by the necessarily existing thinking substance. However, 
as I show below, there is a way of understanding the demonstration according to which this mention of E1p11 does real work.
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assumption leads us to conceive of (the same) thought both as constituting and not constituting the idea of 
God. 
I would like to propose an alternative reconstruction, one that generalizes to other attributes, incorpo-
rates E1p11, and gets to the absurdity directly. Return to this portion of the demonstration:
[1.c.i] But [thought can] not [be determined] through thought itself, insofar as [quatenus] it consti-
tutes the idea of God (for to that extent [thought] is supposed to be finite). 
Above we interpreted ‘thought itself, insofar as it constitutes the idea of God’ to be the assumed finite for-
mally real idea of God: the ‘insofar as’ was supposed to focus our attention on the mode of substance. But a 
mode cannot limit itself, so must be limited by something else. The reconstruction above emphasizes that 
this limiting thing must also be finite; absurdity results because substance, which is infinite, cannot play 
that role. 
Yet it is also possible to read ‘thought itself, insofar as it constitutes the idea of God’ not as the finite 
formally real idea of God, but rather as the substance on whose formal reality the mode depends for its 
formal reality. On this reading, thinking substance constitutes, in the sense of makes or causes, the mode; 
the ‘insofar as’ focuses attention on thought as the immanent cause of its own mode. While it is true that a 
finite thing cannot limit itself, that is not the reason we must appeal to something else. The problem, rather, 
is that to say that thought is determined through the thinking substance insofar as it constitutes, or causes, 
the finite mode is just to restate what we have already supposed for reductio.
[1.c.ii] Therefore, [thought must be determined] through thought insofar as it does not constitute 
the idea of God, which nevertheless (by E1p11) must necessarily exist. 
Again, thought can only be limited by thought (by E1d2), so the assumed idea of God must be limited by 
something that is also thought. We have already ruled out the possibilities a) that the idea of God limits 
itself and b) that what does the limiting is the thinking substance on which the idea of God depends for 
its formal reality (‘thought itself, insofar as it constitutes the idea of God’).82 So what is doing the limiting 
must be thought that is external to both the assumed finite mode and the substance that constitutes that 
mode. However, this is just to posit another thinking substance: thought that ‘nevertheless (by E1p11) must 
necessarily exist.’ There is just one infinite, necessarily existing thinking substance.83 So the one thinking 
substance is conceived both ‘as constituting the idea of God and as not constituting it.’ This is absurd, and 
so we can assert the contrary of our hypothesis. Only a non-finite idea, a thing whose formal reality does not 
require positing an external limiter, can follow from thinking substance; such a non-finite idea is, of course, 
just an infinite idea. 
So reconstructed, the demonstration incorporates the mention of E1p11 in [1.c.ii] and gets to the absurd-
ity directly. It also generalizes to other attributes: we could run the demonstration with a finite body, but 
we would again be forced to posit more than one formally real substance (this time under the attribute of 
extension). 
…what follows must be eternal 
I will quote the second stage of the demonstration in full:
[2.a] Next, what follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a 
determinate [NS: existence, or] duration. For if you deny this, then suppose there is, in some attrib-
ute of God, a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of that attribute—for example, 
idea Dei in cogitatione—and suppose that at some time [this idea] did not exist or will not exist. 
 82 We can also rule out that it is another mode of the same substance that is doing the limiting; positing another finite idea that is 
doing the limiting merely pushes the question back to what has limited that limiting idea, and that just amounts to restating what 
we have assumed for reductio.
 83 Although Spinoza does not cite it, I think we are supposed to recall E1p5, ‘in nature there cannot be two or more substances of 
the same attribute.’ Other reconstructions neglect to incorporate the second occurrence of E1p11 in the demonstration; my recon-
struction supposes that Spinoza neglected to cite something he was, in fact, assuming. I am not entirely sure how to weigh these 
tradeoffs. However, I think it is likely that if Spinoza takes the care to cite a proposition, it’s likely he meant it to do important work 
in the proof and should not be discounted. I think he can be excused for sometimes failing to make explicit all the propositions 
required for a proof to work. 
Primus: Spinoza’s ‘Infinite Modes’ Reconsidered Art. 11, page 17 of 29
[2.b] But since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it must exist necessarily and be immu-
table (by E1p11 and E1p20c2). [2.c] So beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it 
is supposed that at some time [this idea] did not exist or will not exist) thought will have to exist 
without the idea of God. 
[2.d] But this is contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that the idea of God follows necessar-
ily from the given thought. Therefore, the idea of God in thought, or anything else which follows 
necessarily from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration, 
but through the same attribute is eternal. This was the second thing [NS: to be proven]. Note that 
the same is to be affirmed of any thing which, in some attribute of God, follows necessarily from 
God’s absolute nature. 
Spinoza reintroduces the reductio assumption: namely, that the idea of God exists for some limited time 
[2.a]. Spinoza reminds us that the attribute of thought exists necessarily (E1p11) and is immutable (E1p20c2) 
[2.b]. The situation we are assuming, then, is one in which we have a necessarily existing, immutable sub-
stance and a mode that only endures for some time. This means that there are times at which the mode does 
not exist [2.c]. 
However, this leads to absurdity. Spinoza does not make his reasoning explicit, but I think we are sup-
posed to remember E1p20c2’s point that it is absurd to suppose that the essence of substance could change. 
Spinoza reminds us that it is supposed that the mode follows with necessity from the necessarily existing 
essence of thinking substance [2.d]. For the mode to not follow, which is the case at all of those times at 
which the mode does not exist, we would have to suppose that the essence of substance is different at those 
times. 
We can thus deny our assumption: the idea of God cannot exist for some limited time. Its existence is 
necessary (in virtue of substance’s essence being necessary), and thus eternal.84 This will apply to anything 
following with necessity from the absolute nature of God.
It is sometimes argued that this second stage establishes the everlastingness of (certain) modes.85 While 
this is a possible reading of the language of E1p21—’all the things which follow from the absolute nature of 
any of God’s attributes always had to exist’ (semper existere debuerunt)—I do not think this language forces 
us to conclude that the things enjoy sempiternal reality, rather than reality that is timelessly eternal. In 
E1p19, Spinoza said that God’s ‘existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.’ In E1p17s, Spinoza had drawn 
a parallel between the infinity of things following from the divine nature and what follows from the essence 
of a triangle. Such a geometric essence is a paradigm case of a true and immutable nature, an eternal truth.86 
In this context, it is reasonable to suppose that Spinoza is arguing that the propria following from the divine 
essence (whether that essence, or attribute, is extension, thought, or some other attribute), like the propria 
following from the true and immutable nature of a triangle, also enjoy the reality of eternal truths or true 
and immutable natures. From the perspective of someone reasoning in time, the true and immutable nature 
of a triangle always exists, even if the nature’s eternal reality is not reality that can properly be said to be 
enduring. Perhaps in saying that the things which follow from the absolute nature of God’s attributes always 
had to exist, Spinoza is just making a similar point. If a substantial essence (attribute) is eternally real, then, 
from the perspective of someone reasoning in time, that essence, as well as all of that essence’s propria, 
always exists, but this does not mean that it is apt to say that the eternally real entities themselves endure 
over time. 
One might protest that making the effects timelessly eternal makes modes too much like substance, and 
that this is reason enough to suppose that the effects under discussion in E1p21 are sempiternal. But had 
Spinoza wanted to signal that God’s nature is the only nature that is timelessly eternal, we should expect him 
to announce this.87 Furthermore, even if both substance and modes enjoy the timelessly eternal reality of 
eternal truths, this does not mean that we cannot identify a key difference between them. In E1p24, Spinoza 
points to just such a difference: unlike God’s own essence, the ‘essence of things produced by God does not 
 84 See E1d8 for the equation of necessary existence and eternity.
 85 See Curley (1969: 107, 116; Gueroult 1968: I.309; Melamed 2013: 122–126; Wolfson 1934: I.376–377).
 86 See the beginning of the Fifth Meditation, AT VII.64.
 87 Cf. Melamed (2012). Spinoza makes such an announcement in the Cogitata Metaphysica: ‘I call this infinite existence eternity, 
which is to be attributed to God alone, and not to any created thing, even though its duration should be without beginning or end’ 
(G I.252). I am not so sure we can assume this much continuity between the CM and the Ethics. 
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involve existence’ (E1p24).88 There is, just as we expect from modes, ontological dependence: modes have 
the reality they because they inhere in their immanent cause, the eternal substance.89 
Before I turn to E1p22, I want to point to one upshot of the reconstruction of E1p21d I have provided. On 
most reconstructions of E1p21d, Spinoza employs the same strategy for reductio twice: that is, in order for 
the idea Dei to be limited either in reality (i.e., be finite) or be limited in duration (i.e., be non-eternal), we 
must already assume that there is already some limited (and limiting) thing; but in that case, what follows 
does not follow from the absolute nature of substance, because it does not follow from substance alone, and 
that is contrary to hypothesis. So interpreted, it seems Spinoza has been confusingly prolix. The demonstra-
tion can be streamlined without distortion. 
On my view, the demonstration cannot be condensed because the strategy in each stage’s reductio is dif-
ferent. In the first stage, the absurd consequence is that the same thing—substance—is both P (constituting 
the idea of God) and not-P (not constituting it). In the second stage, the absurdity is that we must posit 
a change in a necessarily existing essence (viz., substance’s). If this is how the demonstration goes, then, 
although we might complain that Spinoza could have made his reasoning more perspicuous, we cannot 
complain that he has repeated himself unnecessarily. 
IV.2. E1p22 
E1p22 is an extension of E1p21: 
E1p22: Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification 
which, through the same attribute, exists necessarily and is infinite, must also exist necessarily and 
be infinite.
E1p22’s demonstration is short: it ‘proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding one 
[E1p21d].’ 
This demonstration does not usually get attention, but I will propose a reconstruction of it here. Like 
E1p21d, it proceeds in two stages. For the first stage, assume that something finite, N, follows from an 
infinite mode M. Again, the reality of finite things is such that it is limited and limiting (E1d2). Infinite, or 
non-finite, reality is different: it cannot do any limiting or be limited. The infinite mode M cannot limit N, 
ensuring its finitude, unless M is itself finite. So if N does follow from the infinite mode M, M is finite. As was 
the case in the first stage of E1p21d, the absurdity is that the same thing (M) is both P (infinite) and not-P 
(finite).
For the second stage, note that Spinoza equates eternal existence and necessary existence (E1d8).90 For 
reductio, assume that a non-necessary non-eternal thing K follows from a necessary, eternal mode J. There 
are times at which K does not exist. However, J exists necessarily and is eternal; that is, J is immutable. But 
J cannot cause K to be or not to be unless J itself exists in one way at one time and then in another way 
at another time. There cannot be a change in what follows from J’s essence unless there is a change in J’s 
essence. But J’s essence exists necessarily and is eternal, and so is immutable. In order for J’s essence to be 
different, God’s essence (whence J follows) must be different. But this is absurd, and is the same absurdity 
seen in the second stage of E1p21d. 
From E1p21 and E1p22, we can conclude that what is non-eternal and non-infinite cannot follow from 
what is infinite and eternal; all the things following either immediately or mediately from the infinite and 
 88 In E2p10s, Spinoza explains that even though all modes must be in and conceived through the essence of substance, this does not 
mean that existence follows from the essence of any mode. God’s essence exists necessarily, but it is not the case that ‘anything 
without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived pertains to its essence.’
 89 In addition to the passage cited in note 87, this passage from Ep. 12 has been read as implying that the eternity of modes cannot 
be the timeless eternity of substance: ‘… we conceive the existence of substance as of an entirely different kind from the existence 
of modes. This is the source of the difference between eternity and duration. It is to the existence of modes alone that we can apply 
the term duration …’ (G IV.54–55). For recent defense of the thesis that no modes are timelessly eternal, see Melamed (2013: ch. 
4) and Schmaltz (2015). I do not think this passage conclusively establishes that modes cannot be timelessly eternal, since we can 
read Spinoza as saying that substance can only be properly understood as enjoying eternal existence, while we can ‘apply the term 
duration’ as well as the term ‘eternity’ to that which is not substance. See my “Spinoza’s Monism” (2019, unpublished manuscript) 
and the concluding section of this paper. 
 90 Again, this can be eternal or necessary existence in virtue of essence (this is the eternal and necessary existence of substance) or 
eternal and necessary existence in virtue of substance’s immanent causation (this is the eternal and necessary existence of modes).
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eternal essence of God—that is, each and every one of the infinity of things following from the divine nature 
(E1p16)—are infinite and eternal. The infinity of things may differ in their essences, as the essence of a tri-
angle differs from the essence of a circle, but their eternal reality is, as what is non-finite, such that it cannot 
limit or be limited by anything else.91 Sub specie aeternitatis, everything following from the divine nature 
is on ontological par: any essence, conceived to be eternally real, ‘contained in God and to follow from the 
necessity of the divine nature’ (E5p29s), is as eternally real as any other.92 
Before turning to E1p23, I want to briefly point out that on my reconstruction, E1p21–22 can be taken to 
target a claim Descartes makes about the idea of reality that is finite and limited (either in time or in space). 
For Descartes, the idea of the infinite—that is, God’s infinite reality—is not generated by starting with the 
idea of our own finite reality and then just removing limits on that reality: that only gives us the indefinite. 
Instead, the idea of the infinite is prior to the idea of the finite or limited.93 Descartes sometimes suggests 
that the idea of the finite is the idea of a limitation, or negation, of this prior idea of the infinite:
I say that the notion I have of the infinite is in me before that of the finite because, by the mere 
fact that I conceive being, or that which is, without thinking whether it is finite or infinite, what 
I conceive is infinite being; but in order to conceive a finite being, I have to take away something 
from this general notion of being, which must accordingly be there first. (Letter to Clerselier, 23 
April 1649, AT V.356)
As I have read E1p21–22, Spinoza would say that we need to be more careful. Spinoza agrees with Descartes 
on the general point that the idea of the infinite is the idea of the reality that must be presupposed when-
ever we consider the reality of any of God’s effects, but he will insist that the reality of these posterior effects 
is also infinite and eternal reality—as he will point out later, each mode has its infinite and eternal reality 
in virtue of its cause (substance), not in virtue of its own essence.94 For Spinoza, to think that substance’s 
reality could admit of limits is to misapprehend substance’s reality; properly understood, that reality cannot 
be understood as limiting or limited. A finite, non-eternal thing cannot be understood as substance’s reality 
with limits imposed, or something ‘taken away.’95 
 91 I think ‘what is common to all things and is equally in the part and the whole’ (see E2lemma2, E2p37), as well as the properties 
of things mentioned in E2p39, follow with necessity from the divine nature (while I cannot say more here, I suspect that the 
essences of singular things can be adequately understood in terms of these properties). I think the more ‘immediate’ modes are 
the more general common notions (e.g., Euclidean common notions); more ‘mediate’ modes presuppose what is more common. 
So the essence rectangle is a more immediate eternal, infinite mode than the essence cube, which is in turn more immediate than 
the essence of some particular cube. What I want to emphasize here is that the immediacy and mediacy is not a matter of some 
modes serving as causal intermediaries between God and other modes. While one may need to understand many other properties 
or essences to have an adequate idea of some particular essence, when that essence is conceived as enjoying infinite and eternal 
reality, it can, by itself, be cognized as immanently caused by and inhering in the infinite and eternal substance. I discuss this 
further in “Spinoza’s Monism” (2019, unpublished manuscript) and “Finding oneself in God: scientia intuitiva as a metaphysically 
self-locating thought” (forthcoming-a).
 92 I thereby disagree with views according to which ‘immediate’ infinite modes (i.e., those described in E1p21) are timelessly eternal 
while ‘mediate’ infinite modes (i.e., those described in E1p22) are not. Gueroult (1968: I.321–322) holds such a view, as does 
Nadler, who argues that ‘an infinite series of finite modes understood as formal essences makes up an immediate infinite mode 
under each attribute, while an infinite series of finite modes understood as durationally existing entities makes up a mediate infi-
nite mode under each attribute’ (2012: 228). 
 93 This is important for the Third Meditation proof of God’s existence. If the idea of the infinite were posterior to the idea of the finite, 
then one could construct that idea starting from the idea of the finite. But in that case, the presence of an idea with ‘infinite’ objec-
tive reality could not be used to prove the formal reality of an infinite being, God; that idea could have simply been generated from 
the Meditator’s idea of his own finite reality as a thinking thing.
 94 The propositions immediately following E1p23 clarify that the fact that all of God’s effects are infinite and eternal does not imply 
that modes are in fact substances. The difference between the essences of things that are not God and God (considered under any 
attribute) is that the former are essences that do not include existence (E1p24). Everything that is eternally, infinitely real is real 
because God is the cause of that reality. That everything that is not substance depends on God for both essence and existence 
(E1p25) might be taken to be a ‘limitation’: modes’ infinite, eternal reality is ‘limited’ because it is not the self-causing infinite, 
eternal reality of substance. This is not the same sense of ‘limitation’ that is at work in E1p21–22. Any immanent effect of sub-
stance can be understood as ‘limited’ in the sense that it is not also a substance, but it cannot be understood as limited in the sense 
of being prevented from having some ‘amount’ of reality that it is conceivable for it to have—as a mode of substance, it cannot be 
conceived to be any more real (or less real) than it is. 
 95 This raises the question of how Spinoza does understand finite, limited reality. I will not be able to venture into this topic here, 
although I return to the question of where finite, limited reality fits into Spinoza’s system in the conclusion. 
Primus: Spinoza’s ‘Infinite Modes’ ReconsideredArt. 11, page 20 of 29
IV.3. E1p23 
Where E1p21 and E1p22 can be read as a priori arguments—given what the cause is like, we know what its 
effects must be like—E1p23 can be read as an a posteriori argument. That is, given an effect, we know what 
the cause must be like: 
E1p23: Every mode which exists necessarily and is infinite has necessarily had to follow either from 
the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute, modified by a modification 
which exists necessarily and is infinite [and eternal].
The reasoning of the demonstration appears to be this. Whatever is, is a mode inhering in God, the one and 
only substance, and nothing can be or be conceived without God (E1d5, E1p15). If something is conceived to 
enjoy infinite and necessary [i.e., eternal, by E1d8] formal reality or existence, it is an infinite and necessary 
[eternal] mode of a substance. A mode is a way its substance is modified, so this mode conceived to have 
infinite and necessary [eternal] reality is a mode inhering in the infinite and necessary [eternal] substance; 
the mode is a way eternal formal reality, or ‘existence itself’ (understood under an attribute) is modified 
(E1d6, E1p19). We know from E1p21 and E1p22 that whether a thing follows immediately or mediately from 
the divine nature, it will enjoy infinite, eternal reality; all the things following from the divine nature are 
infinite and eternal. So if we have an infinite and eternal mode, we know that it either followed immediately 
or mediately from the divine nature. 
IV.4. A Spinozan Meditator
According to my reconstruction of E1p21d, the idea assumed for reductio is the kind of idea Dei that would 
have been familiar to Cartesian readers: it is the idea of God at the center of Descartes’s Meditations, the 
idea a finite, limited human mind has of the true and immutable nature of God.96 From reflection on this 
idea, Descartes’s Meditator proves the existence of God, which in turn enables the Meditator to secure other 
important conclusions, including that God is the creator and sustainer of his being and that all his clear and 
distinct ideas are true. Spinoza agrees with Descartes that human minds have an idea of the ‘most eternal’ of 
eternal truths: ‘the human mind has an adequate cognition of God’s infinite and eternal essence’ (E2p47). 
Of course, Spinoza disagrees with Descartes on the nature of God and God’s relation to creation. To draw out 
the implications of reading E1p21–23 as I have, it helps to consider what careful reflection on the Spinozan 
idea Dei secures. 
If one has an adequate idea of God’s infinite and eternal essence, one understands that God is the one 
and only infinite, eternal, immutable, necessarily existing substance in which everything else inheres as 
modes and which can be conceived through different attributes (E1p1–15, E1p19–20). One sees that divine 
causation does not involve a will that is free by being perfectly indifferent, since the essences of all things 
simply follow with necessity from the divine essence (E1p16–17). One sees that God’s effects are not modally 
diverse: all of God’s effects are necessary.
Furthermore, given what God’s formal reality is (infinite and eternal), one sees that the formal reality of all 
of God’s effects must enjoy reality that cannot be understood as either limiting or being limited (E1p21–22). 
While some essences following from the divine nature (as in E1p16) presuppose other essences, as eternal 
truths presuppose other eternal truths,97 all of these essences enjoy infinite and eternal reality, albeit only 
because God causes them to have that reality (E1p24). Furthermore, there cannot be some other cause, 
besides God, of some necessary, eternal, infinite thing: any such thing is a mode caused by and inhering in 
the one and only infinite and eternal substance, God (E1p23). One sees that an infinite and eternal God’s 
effects are not ontologically diverse. 
One sees that God is the cause of the essence of things (E1p25; see E1p16), and, since all essences follow 
with necessity from God’s necessarily existing nature, in causing himself to have eternal, infinite reality, God 
immanently causes all things to have eternal, infinite reality as modes. One perceives, then, that God is the 
cause of all things ‘in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself’ (eo sensu, quo Deus dicitur 
causa sui, etiam omnium rerum causa dicendus est, E1p25s, my emphasis).
 96 See Schechtman (2014) for discussion of how the Meditator arrives at the requisite idea for the first causal proof of God’s existence 
in the Third Meditation.
 97 See notes 91 and 92. One might think that since an essence E presupposes essence F, E is in that sense “limited” (cf. note 94). Again, 
I do not think such presupposition results in E’s eternal reality being limited.
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By Spinoza’s lights, Descartes’s Meditator got it wrong: had the Meditator had the right conception of 
God, then reflection on his idea Dei would have revealed that his own mind is causally sustained as a mode 
of God enjoying infinite and eternal formal reality (considered under the attribute of thought), not as a 
finite formally real thinking thing created and conserved over time and existing apart from God. Once the 
Meditator understands that (a Spinozan) God must exist, he can see that all of God’s effects are infinite and 
eternal modes of God.98 
There is more that the Meditator can grasp. If the Meditator sees that there is no true and immutable 
nature that is not in, conceived through, and caused by God (E1p23), then he will see that an idea of any true 
and immutable nature is an idea of an infinite and eternal mode of God. Since cognition of an effect depends 
on and involves cognition of its cause (E1a4), he will see that an idea of any true and immutable nature is a 
cognition of God; all of God’s effects are, in this sense, eternal and necessary ideas about God.99
Importantly, with the right Spinozan idea of God, the Meditator will also see that the true and immutable 
nature of some body (e.g., of a circle), considered as an objectively real content of an adequate idea, and that 
true and immutable nature, as something formally real, are one and the same thing considered under differ-
ent attributes (E2p7). Furthermore, he understands that the objectively real content of his idea and his idea, 
considered as a formally real idea, are one and the same thing considered under the attribute of thought 
(E2p20–21). So, if he is able to adequately represent a true and immutable nature, like that of a circle, that 
means that what is doing the representing—his formally real idea—is also a true and immutable nature.100 
The Meditator will realize, that is, that his having an idea of a true and immutable nature—an idea of any 
eternal, infinite mode—indicates his mind, insofar as it has this idea, is a mode of God with infinite, eternal 
formal reality. 
The Meditator thus recognizes that his experiences of contemplating true and immutable natures and 
eternal truths are experiences of his own status as an eternally real thing: he ‘feel[s] and know[s] by experi-
ence’ that he is eternal; ‘for the mind feels those things that it conceives in understanding no less than those 
it has in the memory’ (E5p23s). He comprehends that ‘insofar as [his mind] understands,’ or has adequate 
ideas of properties of things, eternal truths, or true and immutable natures, his mind ‘is an eternal mode of 
thinking’ (E5p40s). He realizes his understanding mind is part of the infinite intellect of God, which is all of 
the essences following from the divine essence (E1p16), conceived as infinite and eternal modes under the 
attribute of thought, or natura naturata (E1p29, E2p11c, E2p43s, E5p40s).101 
Perhaps the Meditator had thought that true and immutable natures and eternal truths created by God 
were merely objectively real in the divine mind.102 Now he can see that such a view is mistaken. These effects 
are not merely objectively real contents in God’s infinite intellect, since they are also formally real. And these 
effects are not merely in God’s infinite intellect, if that intellect is understood to be ontologically distinct 
from human minds: the adequate idea of a true and immutable nature or eternal truth in a human mind is 
the adequate idea of that true and immutable nature or eternal truth in God’s infinite intellect.103
 98 Once the Meditator properly understands God’s formal reality, he can properly understand the formal reality of all things, and 
it seems this is something that could be understood in a flash. Elsewhere I have argued that scientia intuitiva, cognition which 
‘proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition of the [NS: formal] 
essence of things,’ delivers this insight. I have also argued that this insight enables a cognizer to be certain that all of their adequate 
ideas correspond to extra mental reality. See my “Scientia intuitiva in the Ethics” (2017) and “Finding oneself in God: scientia 
intuitiva as a metaphysically self-locating thought” (forthcoming-a). In my “Spinoza’s Monism” (2019, unpublished manuscript), I 
propose that for Spinoza, things conceived as enjoying the formal reality of enduring, finite things cannot be coherently cognized 
as inhering in and caused by an infinite and eternal God; in my (forthcoming-a), I argue that an inability to make sense of God’s 
causal relation to things conceived as they ordinarily are (i.e., as finite, enduring things) explains both why scientia intuitiva is dif-
ficult as well as why it is so transformative. 
 99 Cf. Question 1 in Section I. The Spinozan Meditator recognizes that he was able to have his adequate idea of the infinite and eternal 
essence of God in virtue of his having adequate ideas of infinite and eternal modes caused by God (note that one can “follow the 
proper order of philosophizing” and begin with the contemplation of the divine nature [E2p10s] without realizing how one is able 
to have the right idea of the divine nature in the first place). 
 100 In other work, I argue that E2p8 and E2p9 extend the thought introduced in E2p7: a true idea does not just represent the prop-
erties of something, but also represents the kind of formal reality (infinite and eternal or non-eternal and finite) that something 
enjoys. 
 101 In E5p40s, Spinoza says that it is clear from ‘E1p21 and other things’ that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode 
of thinking. I have offered one way of understanding why Spinoza cites E1p21 in this scholium. Note that E5p40s does not say that 
the mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal and infinite mode of thinking; if E1p21 is to be read as I have suggested, then this 
omission is, admittedly, puzzling. This is speculative, but perhaps the talk of “perfection” in the corollary immediately preceding 
the scholium is supposed to indicate that the reality of this eternal mode is non-finite. 
 102 See Section II.4 above.
 103 According to E5p40s, insofar as our mind understands, it is an eternal mode of thinking ‘determined by another mode of thinking, 
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V
Most commentators hold that Spinoza’s infinite and eternal God immanently causes two kinds of modes, 
some of which are infinite and eternal (or perhaps indefinite and sempiternal) and others of which are finite 
and non-eternal.104 I have suggested that Spinoza has argued for a very different conclusion: if we conceive 
of the one and only substance as a cause with infinite and eternal reality, then we must conceive of all of 
substance’s modes as infinite (not merely indefinite) and eternal (and not sempiternal). Substance, properly 
conceived, cannot be the immanent cause of formal reality that can be coherently thought of as consisting 
of parts or as limiting or being limited. So the infinite and eternal substance does not immanently cause 
the familiar world of enduring, striving bodies that are of variable sizes, divisible into parts, and capable of 
being imagined as larger or smaller than they in fact are. It also does not immanently cause the individual 
comprised of all such bodies taken together, or the whole of nature as an individual (E2lemma7s). This indi-
vidual’s reality can be understood in terms of limits: its reality is characterized as that which does not admit 
of a stable limit or bound, since any is surpassed.
On the one hand, my interpretation has the benefit of bringing Spinoza’s mode-substance relation closer 
to a more workaday, familiar notion of mode and substance. That is, the reality of a mode is simply a way 
that the reality of substance is: as each wave in water is water, so each mode of an infinite and eternal sub-
stance is infinite and eternal. On the prevailing view in Spinoza scholarship, according to which at least some 
modes’ reality is not just substance’s infinite and eternal reality modified, it is hard to see how to retain the 
workaday notion without changing one’s conception of substance’s reality. 
For example, take a view according to which there are ‘infinite modes’ of an eternal and infinite sub-
stance that are sempiternal and indefinite. If we retain the workaday notion of mode, these modes are not 
ways that substance’s eternal, infinite reality is modified, but rather ways sempiternal, indefinite reality is 
modified. In order to conceive of such modes as just ways that substance’s reality is modified, it seems we 
must reconceive substance either as sempiternal or as just that which exists. I do not think either option 
is tenable. Spinoza emphasizes that substance’s existence is indivisible and cannot be explicated in terms 
of duration or time (E1d8exp., E1p15s). This suggests that substance’s reality is not to be understood as 
sempiternal, since such reality can be explicated in terms of duration and temporal units—everlasting real-
ity is reality that endures, but is never limited in its duration (and so its duration does not admit of a final 
determinate temporal measure). I think it also indicates that substance’s reality is not just that which exists 
(so that if something exists, regardless of the character of the formal reality it enjoys as an existing thing, it 
is a mode of substance). 
On the other hand, however, my proposal that all of God’s immanent effects are infinite and eternal 
modes appears to face two major objections.
V.1. Letter 64
A first objection is that my interpretation is incompatible with what Spinoza writes to Schuller in his 1675 
letter (Ep. 64). Schuller asked for some examples of the entities Spinoza discusses in E1p21 and E1p22, and 
Spinoza replies, 
… the examples for which you ask are of the first kind [the kind discussed in E1p21] in Thought, 
absolutely infinite intellect; in Extension however motion and rest; of the second kind [discussed 
in E1p22], the face of the whole Universe [facies totius Universi], which although varying in infinite 
ways, remains however always the same, on which see scholium of lemma 7 … (G IV.278; cf. KV 
I.ix.2–3, G I.48)
This is obscure, and Spinoza does not offer further clarification beyond the reference to the ‘Physical Digres-
sion,’ the short treatise on body and motion in Part II of the Ethics.
This letter is often cited to defend a view of the infinite modes according to which they are laws of nature; 
this is suggested by ‘motion and rest.’ More generally, it is cited in support of the view that the infinite modes 
which is determined by another mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they constitute 
God’s infinite and eternal intellect.’ As suggestive as this language is of (the uncited proposition) E1p28, I do not think the deter-
mination here is to be understood as the limitation or preclusion of infinite and eternal formal reality. Unlike finite, non-eternal 
reality, infinite and eternal reality cannot be understood as limited or limiting. See note 91.
 104 For a sampling of views, see the beginning of Section I. 
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are just a subclass of God’s modes. If Spinoza had wanted to say that all modes are, in fact, infinite modes, 
he would have just said so here.
However, I do not think the examples are incompatible with what I’ve suggested above.
The essence of any body is a ratio of motion and rest (E2lemma5). Now, to understand a ratio of motion and 
rest, one need not conceive of anything determined to be what it is by anything actually in motion. However, 
to understand any ratio of motion and rest, one does need to conceive of extension as that which can always 
be conceived in terms of “motion and rest,” regardless of what the specific terms might be. This, I take it, 
is a basic eternal truth concerning the nature of extension, or what follows “from the absolute nature” of 
extension (E1p21).105
The scholium of lemma 7 makes the point that there is an unchanging—that is, immutable—ratio of the 
infinity of individual bodies’ ratios of motion and rest. In other words, there is a true and immutable nature 
of the system of all things, of all the essences following from the divine nature (E1p16). Granted, Spinoza 
does not say that any particular ratio is also a true and immutable nature enjoying eternal and infinite reality 
as a mode of substance, but I do not think what he does say is incompatible with this being so. 
I also do not think what Spinoza says about thought in Letter 64 is incompatible with my interpreta-
tion. The ‘absolutely’ in ‘absolutely infinite intellect’ is, I think, just a way of signaling that this ‘intellect’ is 
the most basic eternal truth about thought, or the most basic property of substance considered under the 
attribute of thought: whatever else characterizes ideas, they are representations. Here, in using the word 
‘intellect,’ Spinoza also means to signal the truth of whatever this intellect represents. So truly representing 
is prior in nature to any particular true idea; it is a way that thinking reality must be in order for there to be 
any particular true ideas at all. The (true and immutable) nature of thinking reality is such that it can always 
be conceived in terms of true representations.
As Spinoza explains in the first half of Ethics Part II, true ideas represent properties of bodies—and some 
true ideas represent the essences of bodies, or ratios of motion and rest. A longstanding puzzle in Spinoza 
interpretation is why Spinoza does not list a ‘mediate infinite mode’ for the attribute of thought.106 Here is 
a suggestion: Spinoza did not think he needed to because he was confident Schuller would see the parallel. 
What corresponds to the ‘face of the whole universe’—the ratio of all ratios—is the true representation of 
that true and immutable nature. It is the ratio considered not as enjoying the formal reality of bodies, but as 
enjoying the objective reality of objects of thought.107
Again, nothing Spinoza says here is obviously incompatible with my proposal that all the modes imma-
nently caused by God are eternal, infinite modes. 
V.2. A more serious problem?
As I mentioned in Section I, other scholars, seeing that E1p21–23 commits Spinoza to the view that God’s 
effects are infinite, have invoked one or more ‘infinite modes’ to explain God’s causation of the limited, 
actual things described in E1p28. Perhaps God causes finite things by causing infinite modes that are perva-
sive features of the enduring world required for any finite thing to come into being. Or perhaps God causes 
finite things by causing the infinite mode that is the sempiternal individual that is the entire transitive 
causal nexus of finite things considered as a whole. According to my reading, these strategies for making 
sense of Spinoza’s system cannot work: the reality of such pervasive features, or the sempiternal individual, 
is not the kind of unlimited, infinite, eternal reality that God, properly conceived as the one Spinozan sub-
stance, causes. 
Much of the Ethics—arguably much of Part II and most of Parts III and IV—concerns what is manifestly not 
eternal or infinite: things that are affected—even destroyed—by other things. One could complain that my 
reading renders Spinoza’s system inconsistent. All there is is the one substance and its modes; if all modes 
 105 In other work, I clarify how the essences of modes differ from the attributes, which are just what the ‘intellect perceives to be the 
essence of substance’ (E1d4).
 106 See Schmaltz (1997) for discussion of Spinoza’s ‘missing’ mediate infinite mode of thought.
 107 This idea of all things conceived as eternal truths (i.e., as infinite and eternal modes of substance) is an ‘infinite intellect’ (see 
E1p16c1, E1p31). Spinoza calls this infinite intellect the idea Dei (see E2p4). Insofar as the mind understands, or ‘perceives things 
truly,’ it is part of the infinite intellect of God (see E2p11c, E2p43s, E5p40s). See Section IV.4 above. In V.2, I suggest that any 
essence (that is not the essence of substance, or an attribute) can be considered either as real as an infinite, eternal mode or as 
a non-infinite, non-eternal thing. The set of essences that is the “infinite intellect” can be conceived either way; a human mind 
considered as enduring over time is part of the infinite intellect conceived sub specie durationis, while a human mind considered 
as an eternal and infinite mode is part of the infinite intellect conceived sub specie aeternitatis. 
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are infinite and eternal, then everything that is actual, or real, in the way familiar non-eternal and finite 
things are actual, does not have a place in the system. God is the cause of all things, but if each and every 
one of God’s effects is real as an infinite and eternal mode, then God does not cause the reality of ordinary 
things—the actual, always-in-some-respect limited (and limiting) reality in which we and other actual things 
strive to endure (E3p6–7). 
I do not think my reading renders Spinoza’s system inconsistent, but I do think we need to reexamine the 
fundamental structure of that system.108
Spinoza holds that in order for causation to be intelligible, it must be within an attribute. This is a causal-
explanatory ‘barrier’ between attributes.109 I do not think this is the only such barrier in the system: 1) an 
infinite and eternal God’s immanent causation of infinite and eternal modes and 2) transitive causation 
of things with ‘finite and determinate existence’ (E1p28) are similarly sequestered, even when the causal 
relata are considered under the same attribute. Properly conceived under any of its attributes, substance 
enjoys infinite, eternal formal reality, and can only be coherently cognized as immanently causing effects 
that also enjoy infinite, eternal formal reality; what enjoys infinite, eternal formal reality can only be coher-
ently cognized as immanently caused by substance. These are conclusions I understand to be established in 
E1p21–23. Finite and non-eternal things can only be coherently cognized as transitively causing (and caused 
by) finite and non-eternal things. I understand this to be the main point of E1p28. As I read Spinoza, neither 
finite, non-eternal things nor indefinite, sempiternal things can be cognized both as enjoying the kind of 
formal reality they do and as immanently caused by and inhering in substance. 
God’s essence can only be properly conceived as enjoying, necessarily, infinite and eternal formal reality. 
Importantly, however, the infinity of essences following from the divine essence do not involve existence. 
One and the same essence can be considered either as enjoying formal reality as an infinite and eternal mode, 
in which case its reality can be understood to be immanently caused by an infinite and eternal God, or as 
enjoying formal reality as a non-eternal and finite thing, in which case its reality cannot be understood as 
immanently caused by an infinite and eternal God.110 So, God is the cause of all things and all things are 
modes; it is just that we cannot coherently cognize things as modes of God when we consider them as real 
in the way the jostling bodies and impermanent minds of ordinary experience are taken to be real.111 
I cannot provide more defense of this proposal here.112 I will just end by noting that if this is the basic 
structure of Spinoza’s monist system, then it can be understood as providing alternatives to three Cartesian 
views concerning causation. The first is the view I focused on in this essay: the doctrine of God’s creation 
of the eternal truths. The second is the view, alluded to in Section IV.4, that an infinite, eternal God can be 
understood as creating and conserving finite (or indefinite) non-eternal (or sempiternal) things. The third is 
the view that minds and bodies causally interact. That Spinoza replaces the third view with what he sees as a 
more intelligible monist alternative is universally accepted, although there are—as with anything Spinoza—a 
variety of ways to understand the alternative Spinoza furnishes. However, the extent of Spinoza’s departure 
from the other two views has not, to my mind at least, received enough attention.113 I hope I have shown 
 108 I work out more details in my “Spinoza’s Monism” (2019, unpublished manuscript). 
 109 See E1d2, E1p10, E2p4–5. See Della Rocca (1996). Cf. Jarrett (1982).
 110 The distinction between durational and formal realities crosscuts the distinction between the attributes of extension and thought 
(and, presumably, all the other attributes that are inaccessible to human minds). One and the same essence can be considered as a) 
an eternal, infinite mode under the attribute of extension, b) an eternal, infinite mode under the attribute of thought, c) an endur-
ing, actual body, or d) an enduring, actual mind. Importantly, durational formal reality can be thought of in terms of “amounts,” 
and not all things, conceived sub specie durationis, are on ontological par. We can thus begin to see why realizing that one and the 
same essence can be considered either as some limited enduring thing or as an infinite eternal mode of God is such a powerful 
realization—a realization I think scientia intuitiva delivers (see my “Finding oneself in God: scientia intuitiva as a metaphysically 
self-locating thought” [forthcoming-a]). While one will continue to cognize actual, non-eternal, finite things as transitively caused 
by other such things (and as necessary given its transitive causes), once one has the intuition of scientia intuitiva, one’s experience 
is nevertheless transformed: for example, one sees that on another way of conceiving the same essences, they are absolutely neces-
sary—not just necessary given other transitive causes (recall the equation of eternity and necessity in E1d8. See also note 90). One 
also realizes that the kind of reality we expend so much energy worrying about—actual, durational reality—is not fully real. If things’ 
durational formal reality cannot be coherently cognized as caused by God, then it is not fully intelligible; if intelligibility tracks 
reality, then durational reality is not fully real (cf. Della Rocca 2012). 
 111 See E5p29s: ‘We conceive things as actual [i.e., as formally real. Cf. Descartes’s use of the term ‘actual’ in AT VIIIA.11 and AT VII.41] 
in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to 
be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as true, 
that is, real, we conceive sub specie aeternitatis, and their ideas involve the infinite and eternal essence of God.’ 
 112 See my “Spinoza’s Monism” (2019, unpublished manuscript) for more discussion. 
 113 As I read him, Spinoza can acknowledge that we can conceive of durational reality and eternal reality as really distinct, just as we 
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here why we may want to pay more attention: once we do, we may realize that common ways of reading 
certain propositions—or understanding Spinoza’s system as a whole—need to be reconsidered.114
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